

DISMANTLING CORRUPTION:

IDEAS TO STRENGTHEN INTEGRITY IN CHILE



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
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Dismantling Corruption: Ideas to Strengthen Integrity in Chile



NATIONAL  
ANTICORRUPTION
STRATEGY OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE



PREFACE

One of the objectives of the 2017-2020 Strategic Plan of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Chile was to promote probity and fight against corruption. For that purpose, the Comptroller's Office had constantly adopted good practices to promote integrity and probity in the public sector.


After four years of implementation of the Plan, the balance of this strategic objective has been bittersweet. On the one hand, the institution has positioned itself as a benchmark in the fight against corruption. In fact, it is recognized as the main institution responsible for combating this scourge. Thus, 64.3% of the people who participated in the consultation that serves as the basis for this study, strongly agree with associating this role with the mission of the Comptroller's Office. However, the increase in the perception of corruption constitutes a generalized situation in Chilean society, where 77% of the respondents indicate that Chile is a corrupt or very corrupt country.

The challenge of corruption is not only its measurement, or the hidden practices that comprise it, or how difficult it is sometimes to punish it; it is also that this phenomenon permanently undermines democracy, which is the most serious problem posed by this phenomenon. Many cases of corruption have affected the democratic system as a whole, resulting in the emergence of populist leaderships that propose easy solutions to complex problems, such as the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, international experience has shown that sometimes the remedy is worse than the disease.

In this scenario: How to fight against corruption? There is no single solution, and any instrument designed will probably have to be modified and adapted over time. Regardless of the instruments, the solutions must seek to strengthen essential ethical principles in citizens. There is one value at the base of a cohesive society and a solid democracy: trust. Trust is key to the political system and life in society; without it, there is no participation or representation, and social projection is not possible.

This study will serve as a cornerstone for the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, as it shows that expectations –what is committed– must be aligned with effective actions –what is done– to strengthen trust as the foundation of life in society. “Talk the talk, walk the walk,” it is said in the Anglo-Saxon world. Public and private sector, and society as a whole must help build that trust with something as simple as aligning expectations with what is actually done. The Hispanic expression “*Predicar con el ejemplo*” (lead by example in English) is the core idea of this study for building a path, based on trust, for a better democracy.

Jorge Bermúdez Soto,
Comptroller General of the Republic



PROLOGUE

Corruption is a phenomenon that develops in the dark, that thrives on the complicit silence of those who tolerate it, and multiplied when citizens treat it with indifference. The effects of this problem are obvious and have a great impact on our societies. Corruption slows economic growth, leads to erroneous public policies, prevents the most vulnerable people from accessing the social programs they need, and undermines citizen's trust in institutions and their representatives.

To tackle these problems, OECD member countries have developed multiple instruments and initiatives. For more than two decades, the OECD has had the Anti-Bribery Convention, the first and only international instrument that focuses on the “supply” side of corruption. More recently, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation on Public Integrity in 2017, which aims to establish a preventive and multidimensional strategy to address this phenomenon through its 13 principles. This initiative was complemented in 2020 with the publication of the OECD Manual on Public Integrity, which establishes clear guidelines on the implementation of these principles and on how public and private institutions and civil society organizations can collaborate in strengthening integrity. Today, we are seeing how each of these recommendations is being translated into concrete initiatives to decisively fight corruption.

Over the last decade, the OECD has recognized the value of supreme audit institutions as a critical link in this matter –in the case of Chile, in reports published in 2014 and 2016–. Beyond their traditional audit work, these bodies can provide

valuable information to improve the operation of processes and programs, helping governments adapt to future trends and risks. This study is also proof of this. From the point of view of control and oversight, comprehensive knowledge can be obtained to recognize the existing risks in the use of public resources and to propose specific measures that aim to strengthen good governance.

The study “Dismantling Corruption: Ideas to Strengthen Integrity in Chile” is a work aligned with the good practices of the Integrity Manual, which the OECD Council seeks to promote. Starting from a coordinated effort between civil society, academia and the public sector, the study invites to reflect on the main challenges that corruption presents in the country through a clear and friendly language for the general public. The publication concludes with a series of relevant considerations on how to strengthen public integrity in the long term, responding to the challenges that Chile is beginning to face.

The fight against corruption is a complex and long-term process. The best solutions do not come from one sector in particular, but rather from coordinated work between multiple actors in society. In this sense, it is essential that governments, autonomous public entities, academia, the private sector and citizens in general work together to address the causes of corruption and reduce its effects. Only then it will be possible to achieve better public policies for a better life.

Ángel Gurría,
Secretary-General of the OECD



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
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
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PRESENTATION

Building roads to strengthen probity and combat corruption is not an easy task. It requires illuminating those areas where opacity reigns, giving a voice to the victims of this scourge and ending the citizen's indifference, factors which feed corrupt practices at any level. For that, an agile attitude will make it possible to first warn and then respond in a timely manner to the sophisticated forms this phenomenon takes. All this, without losing sight of the need to establish a long-term view to attack the deepest roots of the problem.

The magnitude of the challenge posed determines that the search for ideas to rethink the usual way in which corruption has been fought cannot be undertaken exclusively by the public sector. It is necessary to embrace new trends and good international practices, learn from past efforts and build bridges with other actors, such as academia and organized civil society so that they actively participate in the design and implementation of effective measures to combat the phenomenon.

This study is developed in that sense. Based on work coordinated between the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Center for Regional Studies of the School of Economic and Administrative Sciences of Universidad Austral de Chile and the Transparency International national chapter, *Chile Transparente*, this study aims to conceptualize, explore and analyze the problem of corruption in our territory.

The document is structured into four chapters. First, 10 general questions are formulated and answered, as a way of


introducing the population to the study and understanding of the phenomenon. Then, the results of a citizen consultation carried out this year are presented, in which more than 16 thousand people participated. The consultation assessed the perceived corruption in the country and the main attitudes of individuals towards this scourge. The third chapter describes a set of international good practices to strengthen integrity. Finally, three major paths are shown through which public institutions should advance to strengthen and consolidate a culture of probity in our country.

The study, the analyses developed, and the ideas presented should not be understood as a universal response to the challenges that Chile faces in terms of anti-corruption. On the contrary, they modestly aspire to be an initial contribution to the public discussion that the country will face in the coming years. The approaches are also an invitation for society, as a whole, to reflect on the role that each individual plays in strengthening integrity and the collaborative construction of a more transparent and proven democracy.

Chapter 1:

10 questions on corruption in Chile





10 QUESTIONS ON CORRUPTION IN CHILE

This chapter provides a list of matters that are essential to understanding the phenomenon of corruption in Chile. Questions and answers provide an introductory conceptual framework and relevant information on this phenomenon in Chile.

The chapter is structured as follows: first, questions are responded, which allows establishing a general definition of what corruption is, what actions are considered corrupt, which areas are most exposed to a lack of probity and what the factors are that increase the risks of this type of act occurring; second, it answers the questions related to current measures on corruption, what actions are being implemented at the international and national level to combat this phenomenon, and what the challenges are in Chile in anti-corruption matters. This chapter concludes with a description of the institutions where anti-corruption complaints can be reported and what the Comptroller's Office is doing to combat this scourge.

1. What is meant by corruption?


The most accepted definition of corruption is the one provided by Transparency International, who defines it as “the abuse of power for personal gain.”

Corruption is a phenomenon that is constantly evolving and takes various forms, according to historical and social factors. This has made it difficult to accept a single definition that can be applied to the different political, cultural or value-based scenarios in which this event occurs.

The difficulty described is also evident in the regulations. Currently, the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption are the most relevant international standards on the matter, however, they do not provide a definition of this phenomenon. Likewise, the different rules that regulate the subject in Chile do not provide a definition of what is understood by corruption either.

In the academic area, there are some proposals for defining the phenomenon of corruption. Yale University professor Susan Rose-Ackerman (2001) posits that corruption is the “misuse of public power for private gain” (p. 32). Meanwhile, Robert Klitgaard (1994), professor of Claremont Graduate University, does the same, postulating that corruption is “the misuse of a position for personal benefit” (p. 26). In this sense, Klitgaard points out that corruption means charging an illicit price for a service or using public or private authority for other illicit purposes. Also, this author is the creator of one of the main premises of the current anti-corruption debate in the world, which describes a formula for understanding and defining corruption:

Image 1.1: Formula to understand corruption



Source: Klitgaard (1994).

In this sense, he proposes that corruption can be fostered and developed when agents have great power in decision-making, enjoy high levels of discretion and proceed with little transparency in their determinations.

Currently, the most accepted definition, both at the academic and institutional level, is the one delivered by Transparency International. This civil society organization proposes a broad vision of corruption, defining it as “the abuse of power for personal gain” (Transparencia Internacional, 2020), which can be classified as: large-scale, small-scale or political corruption, according to the amount of funds lost and the sector in which it occurs.

Adopting an extended definition of this phenomenon allows us to leave behind a vision that restricts it exclusively to bribery. Thus, corruption is understood to be a complex phenomenon that manifests itself in various forms, some more obvious such as bribery or embezzlement of public resources, and others more sophisticated such as influence peddling and lack of probity.

There are three levels to classify the lack of probity that could generate cases of corruption.

2. What actions can be considered corruption?

The scourge of corruption manifests itself in multiple ways, according to the political, social, cultural and temporal context. For this reason, determination of typologies to classify those actions that can be considered corruption is not an easy task.

The main international conventions on the matter provide a first general approach to identify possible acts of corruption. First, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) lists certain behaviors that are considered corrupt, including bribery or kickbacks, embezzlement of public funds, misappropriation, embezzlement or diversion of resources by a public official, influence peddling, abuse of office, illicit enrichment, and money laundering (Naciones Unidas, 2004). Similarly, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) includes as corrupt practices «bribery or gifts, embezzlement, abuse of power, transnational bribery, illicit enrichment and the misappropriation of public funds» (OEA, 1996, article 6).

As can be seen, the lists of behaviors provided by these conventions serve as a first approach to classifying types of corruption, but their focus is eminently criminal and, therefore, they do not consider other actions that, in a broad sense, are also corrupt.

Based on the foregoing, multiple international agencies and leading academics on the matter (Heywood *et al.*, 2017; OCDE, 2020; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Transparencia Internacional, 2020) propose that less obvious forms of corruption, such as administrative and ethical offenses be included in the classification. While these actions may have less impact than more classic manifestations such as fraud or bribery, they are bad practices that could be precedents for more serious and systematic cases of corruption.

The following is a description of a series of integrity offenses that can be considered corrupt actions or bad practices that generate an environment adverse to probity. To facilitate their presentation, they have been grouped into three levels.

Image 1.2: Classification of corruption actions

Level 1: **Crimes against administrative probity**

More classic and obvious manifestations of corruption. In the Chilean legal system they belong to crimes against civil service contemplated in the Criminal Code.




Examples



Embezzlement and tax fraud:

- Willful embezzlement
- Culpable embezzlement
- Missappropriation of public assets
- Different public application
- Tax fraud



Bribery and kickbacks:


- Passive bribery
- Active bribery of national official
- Bribery of a foreign public official

Level 2: **Administrative irregularities**

More sophisticated actions of misconduct and that in some cases are associated with administrative sanctions or even penalties. Some of these actions are contained in legal regulations such as the Administrative Statute.



Examples




- Misuse of insider information
- Use of official position to obtain some direct or indirect benefit for oneself or third parties.
- Using the institution's money for personal gain or for third parties.
- Request or accept gifts based on the office held.
- Conflicts of interest, influence peddling or nepotism.
- Carrying out the tasks assigned without respecting the principles of efficiency, effectiveness and legality.
- Using time of the work day for activities that are not related to the work performed.

Level 3: Ethical violations

Behaviors that go against the values of the public office, those that can be formalized in institutional documents such as codes of ethics or conduct.



Examples



- Expressing hateful or discriminatory statements towards other people.
- Procrastinating in the daily performance of duties.
- Arbitrary denial of public information to users of the institution.
- Using office supplies for personal purposes.
- Failure to warn of situations that could potentially generate a conflict of interest.
- Lack of tidiness in daily work.

Source: Author prepared.

This classification allows us to understand how the evolution and complexity of public service has brought about new forms of actions or omissions contrary to probity. If a few years ago influence peddling and conflict of interest might have been common practices in the public apparatus, today there is consensus on the negative impact of these corrupt actions on good governance. Similarly, it is clear that the absence of cases of bribery or fraud is not synonymous with the absence of corruption since, on the contrary, this phenomenon can occur in unusual ways that might even appear to be everyday habits in organizations.

3. What areas are most exposed to lack of probity?

No organization is immune from corruption. For this reason, it is important to study and analyze in detail which areas of the organizations in particular, or of institutions in general, have characteristics or specificities that make them inherently vulnerable to the occurrences of lack of probity.

To determine the areas most exposed to lack of probity, supreme audit institutions (INTOSAI, 2016; OLACEFS, 2014) have recommended starting with an analysis of the risks faced by each organization. This scrutiny should be a permanent and comprehensive process that includes all types of dangers for the entity, including those related to fraud and corruption.


Based on the above analysis, it is understood that public sector institutions will face risks that are determined by two essential variables:

- **Opposing public and private interests.** The State organizations are, by definition, the representation of the public interest and, in the performance of their duties, are linked with users of the entity –supplier companies or citizens in general– who seek to satisfy their private interests. In this sense, the processes where institutions establish some kind of relationship with their environment are a space where two interests that could be opposed converge. Such procedures create opportunities or temptations for lack of probity and increase risks of corruption.
- **Use of public resources.** To comply with the mandate established by law, organizations are responsible for managing the resources made available to them. In some cases, these correspond to large amounts of money that are managed, invested or transferred through complex administrative protocols. If these processes do not have appropriate control mechanisms, they can become spaces susceptible to violations, diverting public funds for purposes other than those budgeted.

The areas most exposed to lack of probity are determined by opposing interests and the use of public resources.

In this sense, the administration of public resources such as money, real or personal property or even information in the domain of the entity carries risks inherent to the operation of any institution.

Image 1.3: Variables of exposure to integrity risks



Source: Author prepared.

As illustrated in Figure 1.3, calculating the degree of exposure to lack of probity or cases of corruption in a given area should consider the combination of these two variables. Thus, the risk will be low in processes with no major private interests involved and where the use of public resources is lower; whereas, in those with numerous competing private and public interests, where there is also a high use of public resources, the risks of corruption cases will increase.

By applying this methodology to the Chilean public sector, it is possible to identify areas that are especially vulnerable to a lack of probity. Some of these are mentioned below:

- **Public procurement:** the convergence of opposing interests of the purchasing institution and the private interests of the supplier company creates a space for the emergence of integrity violations.

This is aggravated when contracts consider high amounts of public resources involved. An example of this is the recent case of purchases of food boxes in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that regional governments throughout the country have been involved in (Villaroel, 2020; Cerna, 2020a; Matus & Ojeda, 2020).

- **Infrastructure:** in the public construction sector, processes are developed in which large amounts are invested, which positions it as naturally risky to lack of probity. At the same time, the relationship between construction companies –whose purpose is the development of urban projects– non-governmental organizations for the protection of the environment, neighbors and groups –who seek the protection of heritage through the protection of neighborhoods or historic buildings– is a space where multiple public and private interests come together, which can oppose each other and provide opportunities to violate public integrity. An example of this are the cases of corruption that the Public Prosecutor's Office is investigating in the Office of the Attorney General, for alleged irregularities in the region of *La Araucanía* (Cerna, 2020b; El Dínamo, 2020; Matus, 2020).
- **Public remuneration and pensions:** the protocols associated with personnel management show the concurrence of the private interest of the person involved and the public interest of the institution. This contrast of interests takes place in a context where the resources allocated to remuneration or pensions could be high and expose the entity to risks of integrity. An example of this situation is the fraud in *Carabineros de Chile* –police force–, discovered in 2017, where officials and individuals were implicated in irregularities in the remuneration processes, and problems in determining pensions in *Gendarmería de Chile* (Basoalto, 2019; Cerna, 2018; El Mostrador, 2018; T13, 2017).

Finally, it is important to distinguish that the presence of these vulnerabilities does not necessarily imply the occurrence of cases of corruption. Rather, they should be understood as areas where organizations are especially concerned and devote greater efforts to preventing and controlling bad practices.

The presence of areas inherently exposed to corruption implies the need to allocate greater efforts of prevention and control.


4. What factors increase the risk of corruption?

Klitgaard (1994) asserts that corruption is the result of processes with a monopoly on decision-making, high levels of discretion and low accountability.


Noted researcher Robert Klitgaard (1994) states that corruption is the result of processes with a monopoly on decision-making, high levels of discretion and low accountability. This makes it possible to understand that corruption is produced by a combination of elements and circumstances that create an environment conducive to the occurrence of these events. In this sense, identifying and analyzing these contextual factors is key to preventing corruption.

The following are some of the factors that, from the perspective of the control bodies, can help create an environment conducive to the emergence of poor administrative practices. These factors are particularly adverse for organizations since they could deepen the risks inherent in each process, increase the occurrence of inappropriate behavior, or aggravate the impact that such behavior has on the institution.

Table 1.1: Corruption risk factors

<p>Opacity →</p> 	<p>The presence of processes that operate outside the general norms of transparency gives the people in charge the latitude to act in the shadows and outside the visibility of the citizenry (Consejo para la Transparencia, 2019; Mulgan, 2000). These spaces of administrative invisibility generate the circumstances and environments conducive to the emergence of irregularities. Consequently, it is relevant to ensure that organizations promote transparency in a general and cross-cutting manner, especially in those areas identified as riskier in the use of public resources.</p>
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Lack of control




The existence of independent and specialized bodies in charge of monitoring the legality and proper functioning of public entities has been widely recognized as the basis of an optimal system of checks and balances in a democratic regime (CAF, 2019; O'Donnell, 1998). For this reason, the absence of these mechanisms to control legality and audit or surveillance procedures, increases the margins of discretion, facilitates decision-making outside the law and limits accountability to citizens, creating a favorable environment for bad administrative practices. Considering this, the existence of autonomous audit entities with a broad and clear mandate is a prerequisite for reducing corruption risks.

Regulatory framework



Just as the absence of regulations is a favorable scenario for the emergence of bad administrative practices, excessive regulations can also cause corruption. There is evidence, both institutional and academic (Engel *et al.*, 2018; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2018), which shows how the structuring of complex regulatory systems renders the functioning of the state inefficient, creates spaces of opacity and makes control difficult. Therefore, it is essential to find the optimal balance between a demanding regulation that is dissuasive and a regulatory system that allows agile decisions, which are not paralyzed by excessive regulations.

Institutional weakness



The implementation of policies, plans or programs through which civil service materializes requires having strong institutions that act effectively, efficiently and legally. When organizations do not have the human, financial or technical resources necessary to carry out the tasks that the law mandates, they are overwhelmed. This can create opportunities for non-compliance with institutional controls and create a favorable environment for corruption (Curbing Corruption, n.d.; Brinks *et al.*, 2019). For this reason, it is essential that organizations have sufficient personnel, adequate budgets and essential technological support to carry out their obligations without political, administrative or citizen demands compromising their integrity.

Low
commitment
of senior
management



The people who run the institutions act as role models for the members of the organization, so if their actions avoid the principles of public integrity or their attitudes go against probity, their subordinates will replicate those behaviors in their own areas of action. (G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, 2018; Treviño *et al.*, 2000). A low level of commitment of senior management in the fight against corruption creates a favorable environment for the emergence of actions or omissions that undermine probity since people tend to underestimate the importance of ethical behavior and consider that their actions will not be sanctioned. In this sense, it is essential that the managerial levels be actively committed to fighting corruption by setting an example through their own conduct, strengthening institutional integrity, and consolidating effective systems of internal control.

Misguided
loyalty



El principio de jerarquía que rige a las organizaciones públicas puede ser un incentivo para el surgimiento de casos de corrupción si es entendido como justificación para mantener malas prácticas o no alertar irregularidades al interior de la institución. La lealtad al equipo o a la cadena de mando arriesga faltas a la integridad, si es comprendida como un pacto de silencio ante irregularidades o un espacio para ejercer represalias contra quienes denuncian (Detert & Treviño, 2010; OCDE, 2020). En consecuencia, es indispensable que las entidades promuevan la anteposición del interés general por sobre el particular en su sentido más amplio, superponiendo el principio de probidad por sobre otros hábitos cotidianos o culturales que dificultan la detección y desarticulación de casos de corrupción.

Source: Author prepared.

Finally, it is important to clarify that the presence of these factors does not imply the existence of acts of corruption per se, but rather, they are elements that create a favorable environment for the emergence of bad practices and irregularities. In this sense, it is central the role played by organizations trying to mitigate or manage the risks associated with these elements or circumstances.

5. Is it possible to know how much corruption exists in Chile?

Corruption is difficult to measure. This phenomenon occurs in a hidden and silent way, without being able to identify specifically how many cases of corruption currently occur in each country.

A first approximation to this fact could be to resort to the number of complaints for crimes of corruption or sentences handed down for these same matters. However, these figures are altered by factors such as the discovery of illicit acts, the difficulties of the whistleblower in providing testimony or even the legal powers that exist to effectively punish the corrupt. All this would lead one to believe that the number of complaints or penalties for bribery or tax fraud is far from being a good indicator of how much corruption is there in the country.

At the international level, the main indicators of corruption are based on descriptions or interpretations of perception that must be analyzed with caution since people's feelings can be influenced by multiple factors and cognitive biases. Consequently, it is important to analyze these statistics cautiously, as tools that provide relevant information on citizens' perceptions, but which are conditioned by multiple political and cultural factors or even exposure to the media (Kenny, 2017).

Currently, there are two internationally accepted indicators to assess the level of corruption in each country. The first of these is the Corruption Perceptions Index that Transparency International (TI) carries out every year. This ranking measures the perception of transparency in the public sector, through an index composed of a set of corruption surveys and evaluations from a variety of accredited institutions (Transparencia Internacional, 2019). The second is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) carried out by the World Bank, which use six factors, one of which is control of corruption (Banco Mundial, 2020).

There are currently two internationally accepted indicators: the Ranking of Transparency International and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators.

The results of Chile, over the last few years in both measurements, enable us to reach two conclusions about the corruption situation in the country:

a) Chile has a good perception of transparency at the international level


The most recent 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Chile 26th out of 180 countries. According to this measurement, the country has a score of 67, where 100 is total transparency. It ranks 4th in the Americas, behind Canada (9), the United States (22) and Uruguay (23). A similar result is provided by the 2019 Worldwide Governance Indicator, in its dimension on control of corruption, where Chile receives a score of 1.09 on a scale of -2.5 and +2.5, being exceeded in the Americas only by Canada (1.77), Uruguay (1.25) and the United States (1.22).

As can be seen in these measurements, Chile has good indicators in the area of anti-corruption, ranking within the top 30 countries in the world in these rankings and among the best 4 places in the Americas.

b) Stagnation in the perception and control of corruption in recent years

Although the country presents good indicators at the comparative level, when observing the time series of the main measurements, it is possible to identify that Chile has not managed to improve its scores over the last few years.

Chart 1.1: Control of corruption (WGI) and Corruption Perception Index (TI)



Source: Author prepared based on the World Bank (Banco Mundial, 2020) and Transparency International (Transparencia Internacional, 2020).

As presented in the graph, Chile has had a significant drop in the corruption control factor of the worldwide governance indicator, while Transparency International’s corruption perception has not improved significantly. Both measurements show little progress on the topic in the country, which has led multiple think tanks to talk about the stagnation in the fight against corruption in Chile (Díaz, 2020; Jaraquemada, 2020).



Finally, it is important to reiterate that corruption is a phenomenon hard to measure since irregularities take advantage of opacity and invisibility to act. For this reason, we cannot know exactly if it has increased or decreased in Chile; we only have studies such as those presented above to try to glimpse how much corruption is there. A relevant point to consider is that these same reports are influenced by certain biases, for example, the publicity of corruption cases in the media or increased civic awareness. These situations will condition citizens’ perception of the phenomenon.

6. How is corruption fought internationally?

Corruption is a complex phenomenon that occurs in many forms and affects multiple dimensions of our society. Therefore, there is no single way to deal with it, but rather, on the contrary, it is necessary to consider a variety of strategies to prevent, detect, investigate and penalize cases of corruption.

Following this logic, the main international initiatives in this matter propose a comprehensive view to face this problem. Below, we present four relevant global initiatives and briefly describe how they encourage states to promote anti-corruption measures.

Table 1.2: Main international anti-corruption initiatives

<p>Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States</p> 	<p>The first international convention to combat corruption establishes cooperation instruments to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the Americas. It considers two purposes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) to promote and strengthen the development of anti-corruption mechanisms and 2) to promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation in the fight against corruption among states. <p>It has an evaluation mechanism (MESICIC) that seeks to support the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, through periodic evaluations among the signatories themselves.</p>
<p>United Nations Convention against Corruption</p> 	<p>International treaty that offers a comprehensive and global framework for the fight against corruption. It is structured in eight chapters:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) general provisions 2) preventative measures 3) criminalization and law enforcement 4) international cooperation 5) asset recovery 6) technical support 7) exchange of information and 8) final provisions <p>It has an examination mechanism that assesses how states are complying with the provisions of this agreement.</p>

Anti-Bribery
Convention of
the Organization
for Economic
Cooperation
and Development



The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OCDE, n.d.) is a treaty in which the signatory countries commit themselves to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in their domestic regulatory frameworks and to implement measures to prevent, detect, investigate and punish transnational bribery. The OECD Working Group on Bribery implements a review mechanism in which countries undergo a peer review in order to motivate states to ensure compliance at the highest level with the provisions of this convention.

United Nations
2030 Agenda
for Sustainable
Development



Plan of action promoted by the United Nations General Assembly in favor of people, the planet and prosperity. It promotes the commitment of states to 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), among which is SDG 16 "Peace, justice and strong institutions." In turn, this objective establishes twelve targets for the countries, including the reduction of corruption and bribery in all its forms and the creation of effective and transparent institutions that are accountable.

Source: OEA (1996), ONU (2004) and OCDE (n.d.).

All these initiatives reflect international efforts to combat corruption through instruments of international law.

Likewise, and from a more theoretical point of view, it is worth mentioning the work of the international team Curbing Corruption (n.d.), which brings together leading academics in the field and identifies eight perspectives for anti-corruption reforms. This classification allows us to understand how, at the international level, states have implemented different public policies to address this phenomenon:

- **Systemic reforms:** focused on perfecting the design of institutions in charge of confronting corruption, efficiently managing the public budget and controlling the correct investment of public funds.
- **Citizen-centered approaches:** aimed at building and strengthening community relations to prevent bad practices and help those groups affected by corruption.

There is no single way to tackle corruption. A variety of strategies need to be considered to prevent, detect, investigate and penalize cases of corruption.

- **Control mechanisms:** initiatives aimed at improving the functioning of control bodies, consolidating their independence and increasing protection measures for those who report irregularities.
- **Strengthening standards and the rule of law:** focused on improving anti-corruption regulations and increasing abilities for investigation and punishment of cases of corruption.
- **Increased transparency:** with the aim of reducing areas of the Administration that remain secret from citizen control.
- **Promotion of integrity:** initiatives aimed at strengthening the ethical behavior, motivation and commitment of those in civil service.
- **Strengthening civil society and the media:** with the aim of increasing the actors committed to preventing, investigating and reporting cases of corruption.
- **Incorporation of incentives and nudges in organizations:** that promote the ethical conduct of their members through the proposals of behavioral economics.

By way of summary, both the international regulatory initiatives presented and each of the reform approaches to fighting corruption provide a general framework of analysis for understanding how this scourge is combated at the international level. The important thing is to understand that there is no single solution, but, on the contrary, the strategies used at the international level respond to contexts and realities that are specific to each culture.

7. How is corruption fought in Chile?

Corruption is not a new problem in Chile. In the last three decades it is possible to find at least twenty legal initiatives that have sought to strengthen probity in the public sector (Lagos & Plissock, 2020).

From an organizational point of view, the international experience identifies three types of institutional models to fight against corruption (PNUD, 2011), namely:

- Single authority in charge of fighting corruption.
- Leading body to coordinate different institutions with anti-corruption functions.
- System that connects the work of multiple institutions in charge of confronting corruption.

The case of Chile fits this last modality since there are several institutions in charge of working in the fight against corruption. The system provides multiple tools to address the problem and reduces the monopoly of this task and establishes a system of checks and balances in which the entire state is held responsible for strengthening integrity. On the other hand, this standpoint could favor the duplication of functions and runs the risk of generating uncoordinated actions to fight against corruption.

In Chile there is a public integrity system made up of public institutions that promote actions to combat corruption.

The Chilean institutional anticorruption system is implemented through the following entities:

Table 1.3: Institutions that make up the public integrity system in Chile

Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic
Chilean supreme audit institution whose main function, as set forth in the Political Constitution of the Republic, is to control the legality of administrative acts and safeguard the proper use of public resources. Within its competencies it has tasks of prevention –constitutional review, issuing of opinions; detection – declarations of interests and assets; investigation –audit actions– and penalties –summaries and judgment of accounts (Contraloría General de la República, 2020).
Office of the Attorney General
The body responsible for directing the investigation of crimes, bringing the accused to court and, if applicable, providing protection to victims and witnesses. Within its organizational structure it has the Specialized Anti-Corruption Unit in charge of providing advice, inter-institutional coordination and training in corruption related crimes (Fiscalía de Chile, n.d.).
State Defense Council
The body responsible for representing the state before courts, through judicial and extrajudicial actions and defenses and advising its institutions for the benefit of the public interest. It is in charge of filing criminal complaints to prosecute crimes committed by civil servants in the performance of their duties (Consejo de Defensa del Estado, 2019).
Financial Analysis Unit
Institution in charge of preventing and impeding the use of the financial system and other sectors of Chilean economic activity for the commission of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. For this, it carries out financial intelligence, issues regulations, monitors compliance, imposes administrative penalties, and carries out training and dissemination activities (Unidad de Análisis Financiero, n.d.).
Council for Transparency
Institution in charge of ensuring proper compliance with the Law of Transparency of Civil Service and Access to Information of the State Administration. For this, it promotes and disseminates the principle of transparency and audits compliance with the rules of access to information (Consejo para la Transparencia, n.d.).

General Internal Audit Council of the Government

Advisory body of the President of the Republic in matters of internal audit, internal control and administrative probity. It coordinates with the internal control units of public services, through the preparation of technical documentation and the development of specialized advice in order to generate and maintain an adequate environment of control (Consejo de Auditoría Interna General de Gobierno, n.d.).

Public Integrity and Transparency Commission

Institution dependent on the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency, responsible for advising the President of the Republic in the study and analysis of national and international regulations in matters of public integrity, probity and transparency with the aim of perfecting public measures and policies in these areas (Comisión de Integridad Pública y Transparencia, n.d.).

National Economic Prosecutor's Office

Agency in charge of defending and promoting free competition in all markets or productive sectors of the economy. It leads the investigations of any fact, act or convention that prevents, restricts or hinders free competition, such as collusive practices or abuses that affect the consumer's well-being (Fiscalía Nacional Económica, n.d.).

Source: Author prepared.

These institutions are part of what can be called a public integrity system. Thus, from their respective competencies and functions, they seek to address the phenomenon of corruption in the country.

8. What are the main anti-corruption challenges in Chile?

Corruption is an agile virus that mutates rapidly and constantly. For this reason, countries are constantly faced with great and new challenges in fighting against the different forms in which corruption manifests itself.

Corruption is an agile virus, that mutates rapidly and constantly.




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Considering the existence of multiple documents on the matter, four recent reports from different sectors have been selected for this analysis. All of these present common recommendations that could be understood as the main anti-corruption challenges that out country faces. Specifically, the results of the following reports were analyzed:

- Anticorruption Observatory (Ciudadanía Inteligente & Espacio Público, 2015) in charge of the civil society foundations *Espacio Público y Ciudadanía Inteligente*.
- Compliance dialogues, a report that gathered the opinion of academics and specialists in the matter (Chile Transparente & IE Law School, 2018).
- Prioritization of legal initiatives for compliance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Chile, which were devised in 2018 by nearly 30 public, private and civil society institutions (Alianza Anticorrupción, 2018).
- Proposals from the agenda against impunity delivered by three civil society organizations to President Sebastián Piñera in December 2019 (Chile Transparente et al., 2019).

After a detailed analysis of the documents mentioned in the previous paragraph, it has been possible to identify recommendations in the following areas:

Table 1.4: Anti-corruption challenges in Chile

PREVENTION		<p>Regulate conflicts of interest. To build a more integrated and transparent state, both at the political and administrative levels, there is a great consensus on the need to establish clear rules that avoid the revolving door between the public and private sectors, perfect disabilities and incompatibilities in the exercise of public service, develop a common civil service career system among the bodies of the administration, strengthen the rules for entry into the administration, define the institutions responsible for audit and application of sanctions in these areas and implement a registry of final beneficiaries to promote citizen control.</p> <p>Promote the establishment of organizational prevention systems. To strengthen an environment of integrity within the different organizations, the need to improve the regulation that encourages the installation of prevention mechanisms has been highlighted, both in the public and private sectors. The current regulations show some advance in this matter; however, it is imperative to make progress in widening its scope and compliance. Special attention is given to the implementation of these mechanisms in small businesses, public sector institutions and state-owned enterprises.</p>
DETECTION		<p>Establish protection mechanisms for those who report. To encourage and facilitate the identification of irregularities, the current legislation needs improving its protection over those who report. In this sense, there is an agreement on the imperative of organizing a comprehensive system that supports victims, witnesses and whistleblowers of corruption, through protection in their workplaces and private lives to prevent reprisals of any kind. A central challenge in this area is to enable anonymous complaints to the police or the Office of the Attorney General.</p>
INVESTIGATION		<p>Strengthen control and investigation institutions. To built better mechanisms for the audit and prosecution of irregularities is a cross-cutting challenge identified in the documents analyzed. In this sense, different kinds of measures are proposed, such as ensuring the existence of a control unit in all municipalities, improving the powers of the Comptroller's Office to directly access banking information from audited entities and granting access to massive data without previous agreement, exploring the regulation of the leniency program for corruption cases, strengthening the ability of the Investigations Police in corruption cases, creating a High Complexity Public Prosecutor's Office equipped with the sufficient resources to pursue crimes of corruption, among others.</p>

SANCTION



Advance in effective and dissuasive penalties. Considering that the fight against corruption is also the fight against impunity, it needs improving the sanctioning system in the administrative, civil and criminal domains is identified. In this sense, changes are promoted in the Public Procurement Court, in order to extend jurisdictional control over irregularities in the execution of contracts to establish fines in proportion to the offense committed by legal entities, to limit access to alternative penalties and to implement a transparent system of statistics for corruption cases.

Source: Author prepared based on Alianza Anticorrupción (2018), Chile Transparente & IE Law School (2018), Ciudadanía Inteligente & Espacio Público (2015) and Chile Transparente *et al.* (2019).

Facing a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, such as corruption, it is important to reiterate that the challenges mentioned here are not the only ones our country confront. On the contrary, this section only tries to illustrate, in a general and introductory way, those common areas that the aforementioned organizations prioritize to strengthen the fight against this calamity in Chile.

9. Where can acts of corruption be reported?

Corruption is an event that operates in the shadows and thrives on the complicit silence of those who participate. In this sense, encouraging any citizen to report irregularities is key to identifying and uncovering cases of dishonesty.

In our country, there are at least four possible ways to report cases of corruption. Three of them come from the public sector and the other is offered by a non-governmental organization. Each of these phases is described below:

Encouraging any person to report irregularities they know of is key to identifying cases of corruption.

a) Reporting channels in each organization:

As mentioned in the Public integrity manual (OCDE, 2020), generating internal channels for reporting complaints promotes a favorable environment for combating corruption.

While in the private sector, many companies have hotlines or forms to report irregularities, in the public sector, since 2015, the National Civil Service Directorate (Dirección Nacional del Servicio Civil, n. d.) has encouraged the creation of a code of ethics that establishes channels for consultations and integrity complaints. These are the first tiers where anyone could alert the occurrence of corruption cases directly through the channels enabled by each body.

An example of this is the channel for reporting complaints that the Ministry of Public Works implemented on the site www.probidadmop.cl. This platform allows officials or citizens in general to generate anonymous complaints or consultations to warn of potential lack of probity within the institution.

b) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic

Complaints made against state administration bodies or against people who perform any service submitted to the audit of the Comptroller's Office, can be entered through the entity's website.

The purpose of this initiative is to make citizens collaborators in the audit work to be investigated to determine the veracity of the above and the responsibilities that may arise.

This channel for complaints is open to any person or civil society organization who can submit their request asking that their identity be reserved. Such submissions can be made on the platform www.contraloria.cl/denuncia or at any of the regional offices of the Office of the Comptroller General.

c) Office of the Attorney General

The legal mission of the Office of the Attorney General or Public Prosecutor's Office is to exclusively conduct the investigation of the facts constituting a crime. In this sense, any act characterized as a crime may be reported to this institution, in order that the corresponding prosecutors initiate a criminal investigation.

Anyone can file a report through this channel. To do so, it should be addressed to one of the offices of the Attorney General: attention offices, local prosecutors, regional prosecutors or the dependencies of the National Prosecutor's Office. It is also possible to file a complaint directly with *Carabineros de Chile*, the Investigations Police or with any court with criminal jurisdiction. All of them must send the complaint to the Office of the Attorney General to initiate the corresponding investigation.

d) Advocacy and Legal Advice Center

Chile Transparente, a Chilean chapter of the organization Transparency International, created the Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (ALAC) in 2018 with the aim of providing free legal assistance to victims, witnesses or whistleblowers of corruption involving authorities or public officials. As part of its services, this initiative provides advice and refers alerts to the institutions responsible for conducting the investigation.


Anyone can submit their complaint through the site www.denunciacorrupcion.cl and within 5 business days a member of the team will contact that person to inform the steps that the submission will follow.

10. What does the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic do to fight against corruption?

Corruption is currently one of the main challenges that public institutions must face. As previously mentioned, in Chile, this responsibility is not exclusively concentrated in one body; on the contrary, the fight against corruption is the responsibility of a series of entities that work to prevent, detect, investigate and punish it.

The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, as part of this system and from its role as the supreme audit institution of Chile, has developed efforts to combat corruption in several stages:

Table 1.5: Anti-corruption instruments of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic


INSTRUMENT	PREVENTION STAGE 
<p><i>Ex ante</i> control of legality →</p>	<p>Mechanism enshrined in the Constitution in which the Comptroller’s Office is charged with reviewing whether the decrees, resolutions and decrees with the force of law meet the substantive and formal requirements required by the legal system. Constitutional review constitutes a preventive requirement of control of legality that is a condition for the effectiveness of the administrative act. During 2019, the acts affected by constitutional review reached a total of 18,684.</p>
<p>Legal opinions →</p>	<p>Through them, the Comptroller’s Office informs the state administration of the correct interpretation and application of the legal system in certain matters that fall within its competence. They are mandatory and constitute a precedent. These opinions prevent potential irregularities caused by an incorrect application of the rules. In 2019, 22,199 opinions were issued.</p>
<p>Compliance support program →</p>	<p>A mechanism that aims to strengthen the institutional abilities of organizations under the control of the Comptroller’s Office. Through a voluntary agreement signed between the Comptroller’s Office and a public entity, a set of management measures and good practices are agreed upon and translated into an improvement plan for the organization’s operation. During 2019, 277 compliance support agreements were executed.</p>

<p>Training of government officials →</p>	<p>The Comptroller's Office has implemented the Center for State Administration Studies (CEA), which aims to strengthen the human abilities in the public sector. For this, it carries out various training activities aimed at strengthening the knowledge, skills and attitudes of those who are in civil service. During 2019, more than 11,000 civil servants participated in the courses offered by the center. In addition to this, it brings off linkage actions with citizens through the Citizen Comptrollers and Young Comptrollers program that provides notions and tools that promote social control of the state administration.</p>
<p>INSTRUMENTS</p>	<p>DETECTION STAGE </p>
<p>Complaints and audit suggestions →</p>	<p>The Comptroller's Office has an open channel for anyone interested in alerting irregularities that have occurred in an entity subject to its audit. These submissions are a direct input for the identification of irregularities through the various audit actions carried out by the institution. During 2019, it received 20,027 complaints and audit suggestions.</p>
<p>Declarations of interests and assets →</p>	<p>The Comptroller's Office is in charge of controlling the timeliness, integrity and veracity of the declarations of interests and assets that must be made annually by the highest-ranking officials in the state administration. Through access and cross-checking with different databases of other public institutions and through massive data analysis techniques, it seeks to identify possible conflicts of interest or situations of illicit enrichment. During 2019, 134,422 declarations were made, with a total of 88,755 declarants.</p>
<p>INSTRUMENTS</p>	<p>INVESTIGATION STAGE </p>
<p>Audit actions →</p>	<p>The Comptroller's Office develops various forms of audit that originate from its own planning or on the occasion of the submission of citizen complaints, claims or express requests from petitioners, such as parliamentarians. In 2019, it carried out 4,015 audit activities corresponding to 729 audits,¹ 328 special investigations² and 2,958 inspections³ (Contraloría General de la República, 2019).</p>

1 An audit is the critical, methodological and systematic analysis and examination of all or some of the actions, operations, systems or programs carried out by the auditee, and which has been initiated on its own motion or at the request of third parties.

2 An investigation is an audit carried out in those cases that produce a high impact on citizens, due to the public officials involved, the resources, the place, or the facts.

3 An inspection is a simplified inquiry whose purpose is the material or legal establishment of facts or omissions. It is called validation when it seeks to verify compliance with requirements and inspection of public works when it deals with issues related to infrastructure.

INSTRUMENTS	SANCTION STAGE 
Administrative summaries →	The Comptroller's Office has the power to carry out administrative proceedings to enforce the administrative responsibility of public officials. These summaries end with a proposal for sanction, acquittal or dismissal to the administration. During 2019, it started 165 summaries and ended 221.
Summary investigations →	These actions correspond to simplified procedures processed by the Comptroller's Office for violation of Decree Law No. 799 of 1974, which penalizes the misuse of state vehicles. In 2019, it began 69 summary investigations and completed 48.

Source: Author prepared based on the 2019 Public Account (Contraloría General de la República, 2020).

In addition to the initiatives described above, the Comptroller's Office has supported, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile's efforts to comply with the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. In this sense, since 2012, together with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Comptroller's Office has led the Anti-Corruption Alliance UNCAC Chile. The Anti-Corruption Alliance constitutes a working group that brings together representatives of public and private institutions, academia, civil society organizations and international agencies, with the aim of designing actions and strategies to comply with the principles of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Chile.

On the other hand, since 2017, the Comptroller's Office has incorporated an objective explicitly related to the fight against corruption in its 2017-2020 Strategic Plan. In practice, this has resulted in a strengthening of its role in this matter, being recognized by the public for its work in detecting important cases of irregularities in different public institutions.

The responses addressed in this chapter have demonstrated the complexity of conceptualizing and analyzing the phenomenon of corruption. Currently, there are multiple levels at which this problem can manifest itself and facing it requires advanced tools that consider the various factors that can facilitate the emergence of these irregularities.

In this sense, the study of corruption must consider elements beyond the merely conceptual or theoretical. With this objective, the next section of this publication will seek to complement the documentary analysis presented in this chapter with a citizen perspective. For that, we present the results of a broad open consultation that collects the perceptions, motivations and attitudes of people regarding the problem of corruption.

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
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Chapter 2:

Perception of corruption: a citizen's approach





PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION IN CHILE

The answers to the ten questions posed in the previous chapter provide a general conceptual framework for diagnosing and characterizing the phenomenon of corruption in Chile. In this context, this chapter seeks to explore the perceptions, attitudes and ideas on the topic, based on the results of the online citizen consultation “What do you think about corruption in Chile?” carried out between August 17 and 24, 2020 and answered voluntarily by 16,809 people.¹

16,809 people participated voluntarily in this consultation.

It is an exploratory study, as it seeks to know people's perceptions and attitudes about corruption in Chile, from a descriptive rather than an explanatory or inferential point of view. According to Babbie (2007) and Hernández *et al.* (2014), such a method is useful when your objective is to examine a scarcely analyzed topic or when the review of the literature and official documents reveal that there are only unsearched guidelines and ideas vaguely related to the problem.

Likewise, exploratory studies are used in the investigation of new or emerging phenomena and, as explained in the previous section, citizen unrest against violations of probity has been very present in the national press and was one of the driving forces behind the mobilizations since October 18, 2019 (Sepúlveda, 2019), which highlights the current need for research to identify their characteristics and recognize their manifestations.

¹ The database of the citizen consultation on the perceived corruption in Chile is available on the website of the Comptroller's Office.

The research question that guides this study aims to provide information on what is understood by corruption in Chile. The exploratory and descriptive approach referred to above does not attempt to answer questions about the causes of corruption; rather, it analyzes potential associations between variables. This is undoubtedly a good subject for future research.

It should be noted that perception is a complex mechanism of understanding based on the observation of a phenomenon and the interpretation made by an individual influenced by cultural, social, and political factors; in addition to the personal characteristics, attitudes, interests, experiences, values and expectations of each human being and does not necessarily reflect the reality of the event, but rather the experiences of each individual and their context.

In this regard, the study of perception allows us to note that "surveys that seek to investigate the frequency of corruption and people's perceptions of their daily lives reflect an interesting paradox that warns us of the complexity of this issue: what the judge understands by corruption does not coincide with what the citizen and the politician understand by corruption" (Gil, 2008, p. 14). In other words, we must take into account the paradox between the way corruption is problematized in the political sphere and the perception it generates in the collective imagination (Figueroa, 2019).

At the same time, it is possible to draw an analogy between the results of perception studies with the level of confidence that respondents perceive towards their authorities or institutions, in the sense that if the subjects distrust the authorities and the people in civil services, considering them immoral, unfair or unreliable, they will think that other people are also bad, immoral and unreliable because, if an authority does not obey the law, why should anyone else bother? (Eek & Rothstein, 2005).

On the contrary, it is estimated that when individuals perceive that public and private institutions behave in a universalistic, incorruptible, non-patronizing way and are efficient in the exercise of their functions, they are more likely to trust other individuals they do not know, creating a kind of moral intolerance of corruption, deception or betrayal (Güemes, 2018).

Based on these conceptual definitions, the chapter is structured into five sections. First, the methodological aspects that guided the study are presented. Second, the results of the participants' perceptions, attitudes, and manifestations of corruption in general are revealed. The third section indicates the outcomes of analyzing the responses of public officials. The fourth section shows the products of comparing observed corruption rates with willingness to report. And the fifth section introduces the main findings after examining the results of the online citizen consultation "What do you think about corruption in Chile?"

The interpretation of the data presented here should be understood as an in-depth analysis at the time they were collected and attached to the people who participated in it, and should not be extrapolated to the reality the country is experiencing.

1. Citizen consultation: What do you think about corruption in Chile?²

This consultation has the purpose of knowing the perceptions and attitudes of people who face corruption.

Seizing the opportunity to contribute new findings, concerns and the possibility of outlining future hypotheses, the general objective of this study is *to learn about people's perceptions and attitudes about corruption in Chile*. Three specific objectives are then derived from this general objective:

- Examine the manifestations of corruption in Chile, in terms of its severity and probability of occurrence.
- Explore aspects of the victims or witnesses, complaints and level of diachronic corruption³ in Chile.
- Investigate people's perception regarding the main problems that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic must address regarding corruption.

Since this is an exploratory study, we chose to use the descriptive statistics technique because it describes "either the characteristics of a sample or the relationship among the variables in a sample" (Babbie, 2007, p. 450) related to the phenomenon of corruption in Chile. Thus, absolute and relative frequency distributions were extracted, as well as contingency and variable association tables from the questions included in the online citizen consultation. The results of each of the questions can be found in Annex No. 2. The variables were processed with SPSS statistical software, in its versions 23 and 27. It should be added that this type of analysis is not inferential, since it does not seek to go «beyond the description of specific observations to make inferences about the larger population from which the sample observations were drawn» (Babbie, 2007, p. 450).

² See the Annex No. 1 to review the complete methodology of the study.





³ Past, present and future.

The online citizen consultation on corruption in Chile is based on a self-reporting process⁴ to learn about people's perceptions and attitudes towards this phenomenon. In the area of applied methodologies in the social sciences, self-evaluations have received criticism and recommendations to reduce what has been called bias or responses of social desirability (Nederhof, 1985; Randall & Fernandes, 1991; Brener *et al.*, 2003). For Nederhof (1985), «Social desirability reflects the tendency on behalf of the subjects to deny socially undesirable traits and to claim socially desirable ones» (p. 264), while Brener *et al.* (2003) identify negative effects for the veracity and precision of self-administered questionnaires in the evaluation processes.

As a way of mitigating the potential social desirability biases that could appear, table 2.1 is presented below with the perspective that analyzes the trends considered and the mitigation actions used by the team responsible for the investigation. It should be mentioned that some biases remain as challenges and lessons for a future application of this measurement instrument.

4 The concepts of self-reporting, self-assessment and self-administration are used as synonyms in this study.

Table 2.1: Potential social desirability biases

 Bias	 Perspective	 Problem	 Mitigation mode
Understanding and information asymmetry bias	Cognitive	Understanding unfamiliar or overly technical terms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use simple and familiar terms for self-reporting. - Application of two pre-tests.
Recall or memory bias	Cognitive	Difficulty defining and using reference periods.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use simple terms and only go back one year (recall corruption actions).
Social media use bias	Cognitive	Targeting of responses by people with high exposure to social media and potential fake news.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Application of two pre-tests. - Control results through the use of social media. - This aspect is expected to improve in the future.
Questionnaire structure and response context bias	Situational	Tiredness due to the length of the questionnaire. Halo Effect.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Five-minute response time. - Not saturating pages with questions, dividing them into different screens. - Application of two pre-tests.

Social pressure bias	Situational	Fear of reprisals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure privacy and confidentiality in responses. - Online administration of the questionnaire.
Bias for mistrust	Situational	Negative perception of privacy and confidentiality.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure privacy and confidentiality in responses. - Online administration of the questionnaire.
Socially desirable response bias	Situational	Low or over representation of a view in the answers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online administration of the questionnaire. - Application of two pre-tests.
Bias for desire to participate more than once	Situational	The same user could answer the online consultation more than once.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Once a person responds from an IP, that IP is blocked. - This aspect is expected to improve in the future.

Source: Fuentes-González (2019).

2. Overall results⁵




Based on the results of the citizen consultation, a complete analysis of the variables incorporated in this instrument was carried out to understand how the people that responded to the question perceive corruption in Chile, as well as the role of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in its fight against corruption. This section characterizes the respondents of the consultation and the main responses they provided.

a) Characteristics of the participants

The citizen consultation was answered by a total of 16,809 people, of which 79.2% are concentrated in the 18-49-year age group (n = 13,313); 54.7% identified themselves with the male gender (n = 9,187); 44%, with the female gender (n = 7,393); and 93.9% have higher education (n = 15,783).

⁵ Throughout the chapter, only the most relevant tables and graphs are presented for the analyses. See Annex No. 2, to review all results.

Table 2.2: Characterization of participants according to age, gender and educational level

CARACTERÍSTICAS	CATEGORÍA	%	Total
Age range 	< 18	0.6	98
	18-29	22.9	3,843
	30-39	33.7	5,672
	40-49	22.6	3,798
	50-59	12.2	2,049
	60 ≥	8	1,349
	Total	100	16,809
Gender 	Female	44	7,393
	Male	54.7	9,187
	No answer/other	1.4	229
	Total	100	16,809
Educational level 	No information	0.4	74
	Primary education	1	25
	Secondary education	5.5	925
	Technical education	15	2,514
	University education	57.6	9,685
	Post-graduate degree	21.3	3,584
	Total	100	16,807

Source: Author prepared.

Regarding the regional distribution of the sample (table 2.3), it appears that 53.6% of the people consulted belong to the Metropolitan region ($n = 9,007$), followed by 10.6% from the Valparaíso region ($n = 1,784$), 6.6% from the Biobío region ($n = 1,105$), 3.8% from the Los Lagos region ($n = 642$) and 3.5% from the La Araucanía region ($n = 592$). This distribution maintains, within certain parameters, the population distribution itself at the country level, according to the 2017 census.

The main occupations identified in the sample (table 2.3) reveal that 36.2% of the people surveyed correspond to self-employed or private sector workers ($n = 6,082$); 31.1%, to public officials ($n = 5,226$); and 11.2%, to students ($n = 1,878$).

Table 2.3: Characterization of participants according to region and occupation

CHARACTERISTICS	CATEGORY	%	Total
Region	Tarapacá	1.2	207
	Antofagasta	2.6	437
	Atacama	1.5	250
	Coquimbo	3	496
	Valparaíso	10.6	1,784
	O'Higgins	3	500
	Maule	3.2	538
	Biobío	6.6	1,105
	La Araucanía	3.5	592
	Los Lagos	3.8	642
	Aysén	1	160
	Magallanes	1.1	192
	Metropolitana	53.6	9,007
	Los Ríos	2.8	470
	Arica-Parinacota	1.1	188
	Ñuble	1.4	241
	Total	100	16,809
Occupation	Not reported/unemployed	8.7	1,455
	Professor	4.5	751
	House-spouse	2.5	418
	Entrepreneur	4.8	801
	Student	11.2	1,878
	Public Official	31.1	5,226
	State providers	1.2	198
	Self-employed/private sector worker	36.2	6,082
	Total	100	16,809

Source: Author prepared.

b) Manifestations of corruption

Of the total number of people who participated in the online citizen consultation, 67.1% reported having quite good knowledge about corruption (n = 11,267). Which, in a way, reflects a high self-perception of knowledge about the phenomenon.

Table 2.4: Self-perception of knowledge on corruption

	¿Cuánto sabe usted de corrupción?					
	1 Nothing	2	3	4	5 Quite	Total
% Respondents	0.6	4.5	27.9	39.6	27.5	100
Number of responses	97	758	4,687	6,651	4,616	16,809

Source: Compiled by authors.


Based on the above, inquiring into the manifestations of corruption in Chile in response to the question, "How corrupt do you think the following actions are?" The following results stand out:

- 96.9% of people believe that giving a benefit to someone for being a relative of an authority is a quite/totally corrupt action (n = 16,291).
- 94.1% of people believe that an authority or a public official who favors a family member or friend commits a quite/totally corrupt action (n = 15,813).
- 92.1% of people believe that a public official who accepts money to speed up a procedure commits a quite/totally corrupt action (n = 15,480).
- 49.7% of people believe that the ineffectiveness of a public official in his job is a quite/totally corrupt action (n = 8,363).


67.1% reported having quite a bit of/good knowledge about corruption.

These results reveal the importance that those consulted give to acts of corruption committed within the public sector.

Graph 2.1: Perception of the severity level of actions.
How corrupt do you think the following actions are?



Graph 2.2: perception of the severity level of actions.
How likely are you to do the following?



Source: Author prepared.

On the other hand, when asked, how likely you are to do the following actions, the following findings stand out:

- 81.3% of people believe that helping a family member or friend using my position in the place where I work is an unlikely/improbable action (n = 13,662) to take,
- 59.7% of the people believe that not reporting an act of corruption is an unlikely/improbable action (n = 10,026) to take.

These results provide interesting information, which will be analyzed in detail in the following sections of this chapter.

c) Perceived corruption

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, corruption is one of the factors that has been at the center of the recent social and political crisis in the country. Thus, it is possible to observe the generalized disapproval against this phenomenon and its effects on the answers to the question, "Who do you think is most harmed by corruption?" (figure 2.3)

- 94.8% (n = 15,930) perceive that it is citizens in general.
- 51.6% (n = 8,672) believe that it is people in a vulnerable situation.
- 27.7% (n = 4,664) consider that it is people receiving state benefits.


Among the alternatives with the lowest responses are:

- State supplier companies with 5.9% (n = 999).
- Private companies with 4% (n = 677).
- Political parties with 1.5% (n = 257).

These results show that those consulted consider that the citizenry as a whole is the most affected by corruption. In this way, it is possible to affirm that they manage to identify with the importance, effects and consequences that corruption has on society as a whole, and give less importance to the impacts it has on specific sectors.

94.8% perceive that the group most harmed by corruption is citizens in general.

Graph 2.3: Who do you think is most harmed by corruption?
(mark maximum 3 answers)



Source: Author prepared.

From the total number of people consulted ($n = 16,809$), the following results stand out with regard to the perceived corruption in the country:

- In relation to the previous year:
 - 70.4% ($n = 11,817$) consider that the country is more or much more corrupt.
 - 25.1% ($n = 4,211$) consider that the country is neither more nor less corrupt.
 - 4.6% ($n = 781$) consider that the country is less or much less corrupt.
- Present
 - 77.4% ($n = 12,943$) consider that the country is very or totally corrupt.
 - 19.4% ($n = 3,254$) consider that the country is moderately corrupt.
 - 3.6% ($n = 612$) consider that the country is slightly or non-corrupt.


- Relative to five more years:
 - 46.3% (n = 7,786) consider that the country will be more or much more corrupt.
 - 30% (n = 5,035) consider that the country will be neither more nor less corrupt.
 - 23.7% (n = 3,988) consider that the country will be less or much less corrupt.

It is important to emphasize that there is a positive feeling for the future regarding the levels of corruption in the country. As can be seen in the previous percentages, the idea that corruption will increase greatly in the next 5 years is present at a rate 10.1 points lower than the high percentage of perceived corruption today.

Although it was pointed out in chapter 1 that corruption is a phenomenon that occurs in all institutional spheres of the country, when it is consulted which areas are the most corrupt in Chile, the trend shows that:

- 71.8% (n = 12,077) believe it is in areas associated with public procurement.
- 65.3% (n = 10,984) say that it is in processes related to staff recruitment.

Graph 2.4: What are the areas where there is more corruption in Chile? (mark maximum 3 answers)



Source: Author prepared.

12.1% of the participants in the consultation mentioned other areas where there is more corruption in Chile. When analyzing the responses that people freely wrote in this option, it can be seen that the most repeated concepts correspond to different state bodies, such as the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, political parties, and authorities in general.

d) Reports of corruption

As mentioned in chapter 1, there is currently a consensus that the fight against corruption should not only be centered on the role of public servants, but that this responsibility falls on all the actors that make up society. In this context, it is particularly important to report acts of corruption. In this way, it can be seen that:

- 48.6% (n = 8,164) of the total of those consulted declined to consider themselves as a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption,
- 51.4% (n = 8,645) of the total consulted indicated that they had been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption.


In this sense, when exploring the behavior of the victims and/or witnesses to corruption, it is observed that of the total (n = 8,645), only 32.9% (n = 2,847) reported the act and 67.1% (n = 5,798) preferred not to do so.

The responses show that people who face acts of corruption tend to not report them, because:

- They are wary of institutions called upon to hear cases of which they have knowledge: 47.4% (n = 2,750).
- They believe that if they did so there would be no consequences: 39.9% (n = 3,484).
- They could have received threats or reprisals: 35.1% (n = 2,035).

Among those who were victims and/or witnesses of corruption, only 32.9% reported it.

Graph 2.5: Reasons for not reporting
(mark maximum 3 answers)



Source: Author prepared.

e) Role of the Office of the Comptroller General in the fight against corruption

Those consulted state that the main media through which they have known the role of the Office of the Comptroller General are:

- Social media: 79.2% (n = 13,315)
- Digital press: 46% (n = 7,725)
- Work or studies: 39.9% (n = 6,711)

On the other hand, from the total of those consulted, 97.2% declares using social media (n = 16,340). Likewise, 85.9% has seen posts of the Office of the Comptroller General on social media (n = 16,340), while 14.1% has not seen them (n = 2,366).

Table 2.5: Use of social media

	Do you use social media?		
	YES	NO	Total
% Respondents	97.2	2.8	100
Number of responses	16,340	469	16,809


Source: Author prepared.

Table 2.6: Views of the Comptroller's Office on social media

	Have you seen the Comptroller's posts on social media?		
	YES	NO	Total
% Respondents	85.9	14.1	100
Number of responses	14,443	2,366	16,809

Source: Author prepared.

Graph 2.6: By what means have you learned about what the Comptroller's Office does (you can check more than one alternative)



Source: Author prepared.


64.3% consulted strongly agree that the Comptroller General is the institution responsible combating corruption.

64.3% (n = 10,574) of those consulted strongly agree that the Office of the Comptroller General is the institution responsible for combating corruption; 61.4% (n = 9,084) strongly agree that the aforementioned institution always works within its legal functions, and 70.3% (n = 11,817) agree or strongly agree that it is impartial in its work.

While only 20.7% (n = 2,813) of those consulted strongly agree that the Office of the Comptroller General responds to its requirements in a suitable time. From this, it is possible to affirm that there is a positive assessment of the work carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General in the fight against corruption.

Complementary to this, when faced with the question, what should the Comptroller General do to strengthen its role in the fight against corruption?, there is a trend towards strengthening the auditing of public resources and having more powers to combat this phenomenon. The following is a detailed presentation of the results of this question, differentiated by the different occupations of the respondents.

Graph 2.7: What should the Office of the Comptroller General do to strengthen its role in the fight against corruption? Responses are presented according to occupation of the respondent (check up to 3 options)



Source: Author prepared.

Based on these results, within the conclusions of this analysis, the following stand out:

- 78.1% of the people believe that the Office of the Comptroller General should strengthen its control over public resources. This percentage exceeds 80% among students, self-employed workers and homemakers.
- 66.5% of individuals believe that the Office of the Comptroller General should have more legal functions to fight corruption. This percentage is especially high among students and self-employed workers, where it exceeds 73% in both cases.
- 35.7% of the individuals consulted believe that improving the response to citizen complaints should be a priority. Similar behavior exists in all groups, except among public officials, where this percentage is lower, at 29%.
- Although in aggregate terms it does not represent a priority, public officials agree that it is necessary to promote training and collaboration mechanisms within the state. While the overall average for increasing training is 29.1% and strengthening collaboration mechanisms is 22.8%, public officials prioritize them at 39.4% and 32.9%, respectively.

f) Use of social media

When observing the behavior of those respondents who claim to have seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office in contrast to those people who affirm not to have done so, relevant differences are presented, taking into account the bias that could be caused by the difference in frequencies between these two groups.

The first crossover studied is the perception of corruption in the present, past and future. It is observed that, in general, those who have seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office have a more critical view of the situation in Chile, but at the same time have a positive vision of the country's future:

- Among those who have not followed the Office of the Comptroller General on social media, 68% believe that Chile is a corrupt or very corrupt country (n = 1,616). This percentage rises to 78% in the group that has seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office (n = 11,327).
- Among those who have not seen the Office of the Comptroller General on social media, 14.8% believe that Chile will be a less or much less corrupt country in 5 more years (n = 352). This percentage increases to 25.2% in the group that has followed the Office of the Comptroller General on social media (n = 3,636).

Table 2.7: How corrupt do you think our country is? Responses are presented according to views of the Comptroller's posts on social media

	How corrupt is our country?			Total
	Little or no corruption	Moderately corrupt	Corrupt or very corrupt	
They HAVE NOT seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	5.8	25.9	68.3	100
They HAVE seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	3.3	18.3	78.3	100

Source: Author prepared.

Table 2.8: Thinking ahead 5 years, will Chile be more or less corrupt? Responses are presented according to views of the Comptroller's posts on social media

	Will Chile be more or less corrupt?			Total
	Less or much less corrupt	Same corruption	More or much more corruption	
They HAVE NOT seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	14.8	24.7	60.4	100
They HAVE seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	25.2	30.8	44.0	100

Source: Author prepared.

Second, in relation to the variable of areas most exposed to corruption, relevant differences are observed in:

- **Public procurement:** among those who have not seen social media posts of the Comptroller General's Office, 58% believe that this is an area where there is corruption (n = 1,393). This percentage rises to 74% in the group that has seen posts of the Comptroller General's Office (n = 10,684).
- **Staff recruitment:** Among those who have not seen social media posts of the Comptroller General's Office, the 52% believe that this is an area where there is corruption (n = 1,239). This percentage rises to 68% in the group that has seen posts of the Comptroller General's Office (n = 9,745).

Table 2.9: Opinion about public procurement as an area where there is corruption. Responses are presented according to views of the social media posts of the Comptroller's Office

	Public procurement as an area exposed to corruption		
	NO	YES	Total
They HAVE NOT seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	41.1	58.9	100
They HAVE seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	26.0	74.0	100

Source: Author prepared.

Table 2.10: Opinion about staff recruitment as an area where there is corruption. Responses are presented according to views of the Comptroller's Office social media posts


	Staff recruitment as an area exposed to corruption		
	NO	YES	Total
They HAVE NOT seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	47.6	52.4	100
They HAVE seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	32.5	64.0	100

Source: Author prepared.

In a third analysis, the opinion on the work carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General is related. In the five questions that this section considers, relevant differences were observed in those people who expressed full agreement with the statements made. This is especially significant in the following dimensions:

- **The Office of the Comptroller General always works within its legal functions:** among those who have not seen social media posts of the Comptroller General's Office, 37.8% fully agree with this statement (n = 705). This percentage rises to 64.7% in the group that has seen posts of the Comptroller General's Office (n = 8,379).
- **The Office of the Comptroller General is impartial in its work:** among those who have not seen social media posts of the Comptroller General's Office, 27.2% fully agree with this statement (n = 565). This percentage rises to 54.9% in the group that has seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office (n = 7,591).

Graph 2.8: people totally agree with the following statements. Responses according to views of the Comptroller's social media posts



Source: Author prepared.

Finally, with respect to the actions that the Comptroller General's Office can take to strengthen its role in the fight against corruption, there is one statement in which there are major differences:

- **More legal functions:** Among those who have not seen social media posts of the Comptroller General's Office, 50.6% believe that the Comptroller General's Office needs more legal functions (n = 1,198). This percentage rises to 69.0% in the group that has seen posts of the Comptroller General's Office (n = 9,972).

Table 2.11: The Comptroller's Office needs more legal functions to combat corruption according to the views of the Comptroller's social media posts

	The Comptroller's Office needs more legal functions to fight corruption		
	NO	YES	Total
They HAVE NOT seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	49.4	50.6	100
They HAVE seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office	31.0	69.0	100

Source: Author prepared.

Although these results do not enable us to reach profound conclusions on the subject, they do help to identify certain effects that the presence of the Comptroller General's Office is having on social media today and how this has set a specific vision of the fight against corruption in certain sectors. Therefore, it is important to analyze these results in more detail and to improve in more precise studies to conclude what role the social media of the Comptroller General's Office plays in citizen perception.

3. Perception of public officials

As presented in chapter 1, with the objective of collaborating in strengthening integrity, the Comptroller General's Office develops a series of initiatives aimed at promoting honest behavior by those who fulfill any civil service. For this reason, specifically exploring the perceptions and attitudes that public servants have toward the phenomenon of corruption is particularly relevant to the institution. The following are the results of a detailed analysis of the responses provided by those who identified themselves as public officials in the consultation.

a) **Manifestation of corruption: level of severity and likelihood of taking ethically reprehensible actions**

An initial evaluation shows that the group analyzed is highly aware that some acts are ethically reprehensible and can be directly associated with situations of corruption. Thus, it is possible to highlight the following:

- 91.4% of public officials who participated in the consultation believe that the fact of accepting money to speed up a procedure incurs a quite or totally corrupt action (n = 4,773). Comparing by type of occupation, public officials are the ones with the highest percentage, surpassed only by homemakers with 94.8% (n = 396).
- 95.9% of the public officials consulted think that granting a benefit to someone for being a relative of an authority is a fairly or totally corrupt action (n = 5,009). However, compared to the other occupations, public officials are the ones with the lowest percentage among the responses of quite or totally corrupt.
- 93.1% of the public officials consulted believe that an authority or a public official that favors a family member or friend is a quite or totally corrupt action (n = 4,867). In comparison with the other occupation categories, public officials only exceed students when considering this action as quite or totally corrupt.

- 86.3% of the public officials consulted consider that those who lies to obtain some benefit from the government commits a quite/totally corrupt action (n = 4,514). The category of entrepreneurs shows the same percentage. They both have the highest percentages in this category.
- On the other hand, only 52.5% of public officials consider work ineffectiveness as a quite or totally corrupt action (n = 2,747). In comparison with the other categories, public officials do not show significant differences.

In relation to the likelihood of committing actions that could signify a lack of integrity, the following stand out:


- 95.7% (n = 5,001) of public officials think that it is unlikely that they will pay or offer money to speed up a process. It is the highest group segmented by occupation, where the average for this category is 91%.
- 85.6% (n = 4,475) of public officials estimate that it is unlikely that they will hide and/or modify some of their personal data to obtain a benefit. Public officials are those with a higher percentage in this category compared to the rest of the occupations, which show an average of 74.2%.

On the other hand, 46.3% of public officials claimed to have been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption (n = 2,420). This index is 5 points lower than the total of those consulted, who indicated that 51.4% had been victims or witness of an act of corruption.

Among the 2,420 public officials who claimed to have been victims and/or witnesses of corruption, only 39% reported some type of complaint (n = 945), while 61% decided not to do so (n = 1,475).

The following graph shows the reasons that inhibit the complaints from public officials and others consulted:

Graph 2.9: Reasons not to report.
(mark maximum 3 answers)



Source: Author prepared.

From the above, we recognize a difference of 13 points in the variable associated with threats and reprisals, which is in absolute agreement with the need to establish comprehensive mechanisms to protect those who report, analyzed in detail in chapter 1.

These results provide interesting information on the behavior of public officials who decided not to report the act of corruption of which they were victims or witnesses.

Continuing with this group and using previous data from the consultation, we can analyze the claimed willingness of these officials to report, who, as stated, ultimately did not report the act of corruption.

The public officials show a significant difference in terms of not reporting for fear of threats and retaliation.

Table 2.12: responses from public officials who did NOT report the act of corruption of which they were victims and/or witnesses. The data are presented according to the likelihood that they think they will not report a case of corruption

How likely is it that you will not report an act of corruption?						
	1 Not likely	2	3	4	5 Very likely	Total
% Respondents	12.5	21.8	43.2	15.1	8.3	100

Source: Author prepared.

From the previous table and considering the responses of the lowest likelihoods of not reporting (values 1 and 2), we identify a 34.3% of officials (n = 506) who show a high willingness to report; however, facing the real situation of the corruption, they did not report. This situation poses the challenge of studying and understanding in greater depth what reasons prevent a person committed to reporting from not reporting situations they observe as a victim or witness.

Coincidentally, with the general results, when analyzing the total sample, the perception that public officials have about the groups most affected by corruption reflects the following:

- 93.5% of public officials perceive that citizens in general are the group most affected by acts of corruption (n = 4,884).
- 46.8% of public officials consider people in vulnerable situations as the group most affected (n = 2,445).
- 29.4% consider the public sector as a group harmed by corruption (n = 1,537).
- 26.9% believe that public officials themselves are one of the groups most affected by corruption (n = 1,404).

With respect to the perception of corruption at different levels of time –past, present and future– among public officials, the following can be observed:

- 65.1% (n = 3,401) consider that Chile is more or much more corrupt than the previous year. This makes a difference of 5 points with the total, which reaches 72.8%.

- 68.7% (n = 3,588) believe that the country is currently quite or totally corrupt. This represents a difference of 9 points with the total, which reaches 80.8%.
- 49.3% (n = 2,577) of public officials consulted think that the country will be more or much more corrupt in 5 more years. This represents a difference of 3 points with the total, which reaches 44.9%.

This shows that public officials are less critical of current corruption compared to Chile's past level of corruption. However, they share with the entire population an optimistic vision of the future of corruption in the country.

b) Role of the Office of the Comptroller General

Among the tasks carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General, of the total number of public officials consulted (n = 5,226), is possible to highlight the following:

- 61.6% (n = 3,178) consider that the Office of the Comptroller General is the institution responsible for fighting corruption.
- 58.9% (n = 2,832) believe that the Office of the Comptroller General always works within its legal functions.
- On the other hand, 16.7% (n = 769) of the public officials strongly agree that the response times of the Office of the Comptroller General are adequate.

c) Strengthening of the Office of the Comptroller General

Projecting the aspects that could strengthen the anti-corruption role of the Office of the Comptroller General, the following stand out:

- 71.1% of public officials believe that more auditing and control of public resources is the greatest challenge for the Office of the Comptroller General (n = 3,717). This represents a difference of 10 points with the total, which reaches 81.3%.

- 54.6% of public officials consider that the Office of the Comptroller General should have more legal functions to fight against corruption (n = 2,854). This represents a difference of 17.2 points with the total, which reaches 71.8%.
- Furthermore, 39.4% of the civil servants mention that it is important for public officials to carry out more training (n = 2,060). This represents a difference of 15 points with the total, which reaches 24.4%.
- On the other hand, only 22.4% of public officials consider that one of the challenges is to use more technology (n = 1,169). This represents a difference of 2.1 points with the total, which reaches 24.5%.

4. Gaps between corruption observed and acts reported

The data analysis showed significant differences. For example, there is a gap between those who claim having known an act of corruption and those who actually report a complaint based on those facts. Thus, and as indicated above, 51.4% reported having been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption (n = 8,645), of them, only 32.9% reported said act (n = 2,847), while 67.1% abstained from doing so (n = 5,798).

It is observed that there would be no major differences in their behavior when comparing the percentage of those reporting and those not reporting within each group. Given that, of the people who were victims and/or witnesses to an act of corruption, 33.5% of men did report (n = 1,675), while 31.9% of the women did the same (n = 1,118).

As in the previous case, no differences can be established when directly comparing the percentages of those reporting among age groups, as there are large variations in the size of each of the groups that responded to the citizen consultation. However, when reviewing the reporting behavior within each section, it is observed that, as age increases, there is a tendency to report more. In detail:

- In the 18 to 29-year age bracket, 22.4% (n = 379) reported.
- In the 30 to 39-year age bracket, 30.5% (n = 893) reported.
- In the 40 to 49-year age bracket, 38.2% (n = 764) reported.
- In the 50 to 59-year age bracket, 40.2% (n = 472) reported.
- In the 60-year or more age bracket, 40.5% (n = 332) reported.

A gap is observed between those who declare having known an act of corruption and those who actually file a complaint based on those facts.

Likewise, when reviewing the most relevant reporting behaviors within occupations, the following reporting rates are extracted:

- State suppliers: 44.1% (n = 63).
- Public officials: 39% (n = 945).
- University professors: 36.2% (n = 160).
- Entrepreneurs: 35.4% (n = 202).

When reviewing the results of reporting any act of corruption, according to the level of knowledge about it, it is observed that, within the groups of people who believe they have good or quite a bit of knowledge, the percentage of reporting is lower than that of not reporting. Thus, within the group that claims to have a good level of knowledge (n = 3,393), only 31.5% of them report (n = 1,070), while within the group that claims to have quite a bit of knowledge (n = 3,012), 43.8% of them report (n = 1,320).

5. Main findings

The citizen consultation "What do you think about corruption in Chile?" is constituted as a first national approach regarding what is perceived about the manifestations of this phenomenon in our society.

The most important findings refer, first of all, to the level of knowledge of the corruption declared, since 67.1% of those consulted reported having good/quite a bit of knowledge about corruption (n = 11,267), which represents a significant number within the sample.

The acts that those consulted indicated as the most reprehensible actions are:

- Granting a benefit to someone for being a relative of an authority, considered very corrupt by 96.9% of the people consulted (n = 16,291).
- That an authority or a public official favors a relative or friend, valued as quite or totally corrupt by 94.1% of the people consulted (n = 15,813).
- For a public official to accept money to speed up a process was considered quite or totally corrupt by 92.1% of those consulted (n = 15,480).

From these results, it can be seen that the first three most reprehensible acts have in common the fact that they are actions in which a public official favors, in some way, people who were not entitled to benefit or who were treated in a preferential manner because of their relationship with the official.

On the other hand, people perceive the areas associated with public procurement, staff recruitment and construction of works as more vulnerable to acts of corruption, with 71.8% (n = 12,077), 65.3% (n = 10,984) and 54% (n = 9,082), respectively.

The social perception of how our country will be in 5 more years indicates that there is a more positive perception compared to how the country is today and how it is in contrast to a year ago. Of the total of those consulted (n = 16,809), 52.3% (n = 8,783) estimated that Chile will be more or much more corrupt, versus 70% (n = 11,831) who think that the country was corrupt or very corrupt a year ago; or 79% (n = 13,279) who think that Chile is currently corrupt or very corrupt.

In relation to this issue, it is identified that those who have seen the Comptroller General's social media posts are more critical of corruption, but at the same time more optimistic about the next five years.

According to those consulted, the greatest victims of corruption are the general public, since of the total (n = 16,809), 94.8% (n = 15,930) consider that this group is the most affected. People in vulnerable situations follow, where the 51.6% (n = 8,672) of those consulted indicated that they are the most affected by corruption and, finally, 27.7% (n = 4,664) of the total of those consulted considered those who receive state benefits as the most affected by acts of corruption.

It is observed that of the total number of public officials consulted (n = 5,226), 61.6% (n = 3,178) consider that the Office of the Comptroller General is the institution responsible for combating corruption and 58.9% (n = 2,832) believe that this audit body always works within its legal functions. Regarding the challenges of the Office of the Comptroller General, 71.1% (n = 3,717) of public officials believe that more auditing and control of public resources is one of the greatest challenges that it has, while 54.6% (n = 2,854) consider that the Office of the Comptroller General should have more legal functions to fight against corruption.

Finally, and as a sign of the gap between the observation of corruption and the complaints reported or the likelihood of carrying them out, it is seen that 51.4% of alleged victims indicating to have been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption (n = 8,645), only 32.9% reported this act (n = 2,847), while 67.1% refrained from doing so (n = 5,798).

It is relevant to add that, of the victims and/or witnesses of an act of corruption who refrained from reporting (n = 5,798), 47.4% did not do so, due to distrust in the institutions in charge of its processing (n = 2,750); 39.9%, because they believed that the complaint would have no consequences (n = 2,314); 35.1%, because they were faced with the danger of threats or reprisals (n = 2,035); and 34.3%, because they had no evidence or witnesses (n = 1,989).

This chapter has analyzed the main perceptions and attitudes of citizens in relation to the phenomenon of corruption. Despite methodological limitations mentioned above, it is considered that the consultation provides a useful image for an exploratory diagnosis of the starting point for developing mechanisms to address corruption in Chile. In this regard, the following chapter will analyze best international practices in this area, concluding with a descriptive analysis of the gaps identified in this chapter and the main ideas through which it would be possible to improve citizens' perceptions and strengthen probity in the country.


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Chapter 3:

International trends in the fight against corruption





INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

The fight against corruption requires the design and implementation of varied and innovative solutions to address the various forms in which it manifests itself. This chapter presents a series of tools and good practices that illustrate the path being followed internationally to strengthen integrity and fight against this phenomenon.

The good practices outlined here are the result of a broad and detailed analysis that considered academic literature, recommendations from multilateral agencies, and international reports on the state of corruption in Chile and Latin America. The set of international guidelines identified can be grouped into five subject areas: public control, technology, citizen participation, ethics, and protection of those who report irregularities.

This chapter aims to describe the subject areas through conceptual description, arguments reflecting their relevance, and some experiences highlighted by international organizations in the following sections: 1. Existing public control mechanisms; 2. Three good anti-corruption practices that can be adopted using technology; 3. Importance of citizen participation in the fight against corruption; 4. Relevance of developing policies to guide and strengthen people's ethical behavior; and 5. Good practices in whistleblowers protection. In each case, a brief conceptual description is provided, with arguments reflecting the relevance of the topic in the fight against corruption, and some experiences highlighted by international organizations are cited.

**The search
for innovative
solutions is key
to addressing the
new forms that
corruption takes.**

1. Robust, diversified, and high-impact public control systems

Control is at the core of human behavior. Instances or mechanisms of control have been there since basic forms of organization to the most sophisticated contemporary democracies.

Control has a key role within anti-corruption policies at organizational level. It aims to reduce discretion and eventual abuse in decision-making. Thus, following Klitgaard (1994), control is a natural antidote to corruption due to it acts as counterweight to government powers that are not regulated or that, because of their impact, need to be reviewed to limit the exercise of power.

Types and forms of control over the state administration depend on the moment of their implementation. According to this approach, public control mechanisms can be divided into *ex-ante* and *ex-post* controls.

a) *Ex-ante* control mechanisms

These types of control are born to limit the powers of those who are in civil service, through explicit rules and mechanisms that indicate what can and cannot be done. They are the most traditional and obvious forms of control in organizations.

International experience highlights the importance of these *ex-ante* rules being simple, low cost, and not requiring significant time from those developing the processes. This allows the implementation of mechanisms to prevent irregularities that optimize processes and ensure organizational work with efficiency and effectiveness (Bandiera *et al.*, 2009).

In this sense, in the international arena, the relevance of the use of *ex-ante* control based on technological tools such as the automation of procedures has been highlighted, which makes it possible to transform it into an effective mechanism to encourage the strengthening of internal controls, discourage the occurrence of irregularities, and provide an input for organizational learning and decision-making at the managerial level.

In the international arena, it has been highlighted the relevance of the use of *ex-ante* control based on technological tools .

b) *Ex post* control mechanisms

Aware that *ex-ante* rules always leave room for the discretionary maneuvering of agents, the international trend is to promote a focus on *ex-post* control mechanisms because of their strong deterrent power (CAF, 2019; Engel *et al.*, 2018; OCDE, 2015).

Audits are the most classic form of *ex-post* control. Auditing is a systematic process in which the evidence is obtained and evaluated objectively to determine if the information or the actual conditions are subject to the established criteria (CAF, 2019). In the public sector, auditing is essential, as it provides legislative bodies, authorities, officials, and the general public with independent and objective information and assessments concerning the administration and performance of government policies, programs, or operations (INTOSAI, 2019a; OCDE, n.d.-a; Pelizzo, 2013).

In order to increase the effectiveness of audits and strengthen their impact, international good practices aim at the organization of a network to coordinate and disseminate the results of these control mechanisms (OCDE, 2020). Efficient and timely coordination between audit entities, attorney general's offices¹, and the public prosecutor's offices is central to this network. Likewise, it is important to ensure a high level of dissemination of the audits results among citizens, since it has been shown that they have an impact on voter's behavior towards candidates involved in corruption cases (CAF, 2019).

**Dissemination
of audit results
makes it possible
to strengthen its
effectiveness
and increase its
impact.**

¹ In the Chilean case, they are the State Defense Council and each of its regional offices.

Box 3.1: Performance audits to improve the control of public resources

At the global level, supreme audit institutions have incorporated new work methodologies with the aim of increasing the impact of their work and strengthening their contribution to good governance. Thus, most of these organizations have tended to adopt more diversified forms of control, complementing compliance or financial audits with performance audits (OCDE, 2017a).

Performance audits are an independent, objective and reliable examination of whether government actions, programs, systems, activities, or organizations are operating in accordance with the principles of economy, effectiveness, and efficiency. The aim is to identify deviations from these criteria or other problems to provide recommendations for improvement (INTOSAI, 2019b). Thus, these types of audits are an effective control tool against corruption, since they promote the accountability of the authorities, focusing on generating suggestions for the strengthening of institutional management, instead of limiting themselves exclusively to detecting irregularities that have already occurred (INTOSAI, n.d.).

In practice, recent OECD reviews (OCDE, 2014a, 2017b) of public control systems at the international level highlight the advantages and benefits that performance audits have in countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, South Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United States, France, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal and South Africa.

Source: OECD (OCDE 2014, 2017a).

Box 3.2: Control experiences in the United States and Peru

In addition to *ex-ante* and *ex-post* control mechanisms, in recent years many supreme audit institutions have explored the development of concurrent or *ex-dure* control in specific areas of relevance to each country. This type of control takes the form of systematic support and assistance processes, in which a multidisciplinary team of auditors accompanies the institution at the same time as the controlled processes are carried out. This would alert the organization opportunely when the control unit identified an irregularity in the progress of activities.

Experience in this regard can be found in the United States Government Accountability Office, which has developed concurrent audits in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, the same law that approved the resources to face this crisis, assigned 0.001% of said amounts to this supreme audit institution, in order to supervise the correct investment of public resources. Similarly, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru has been empowered since 2017 to implement concurrent audits. To date, it has exercised this sort of control in matters such as the construction of public works, the resources associated with the Lima 2019 Pan American Games and the COVID-19 health emergency.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, this type of control carries risks associated with the possible loss of independence of the audit teams as a consequence of the direct and systematic relationship with the Administration. At the same time, the line between audit processes and advisory or co-administration processes could become blurred and possibly complicate the relationship between the auditing entities and the audited bodies. In this regard, it is important to take the necessary management safeguards that allow strengthening the advantages of this model, reducing the risks that these mechanisms imply.

Source: Oyola (2020) and Shack (2019).

One last relevant point in this matter is to recognize the role of the supreme audit institutions, the name by which bodies such as the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic are internationally known. These bodies are the institutional base with the ability to monitor and audit civil service (CAF, 2019; Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998). Therefore, external control bodies must be:

- Robust, with a clear and broad mandate that facilitates a long-term institutional commitment that transcends the political cycles of the audited entities.
- Reliable and acting in coordination with other related entities –attorney general’s offices, public prosecutor’s offices, legislative and executive branches, citizens– so that their findings are effectively transformed into administrative, civil, criminal, political, or electoral sanctions.

- Politically independent and with total autonomy to define their work plans and the contents and timing of their audit reports. Those independent audit entities can find greater amounts of irregularities than those bodies that are not.
- Open to new and adaptive trends. The control bodies must be alert to the new forms that corruption takes, adapting their mechanisms to detect irregularities efficiently.

In summary, international experience shows the importance of developing diverse control mechanisms that address the different forms and moments in which corruption occurs. In this sense, it is essential to have robust, independent, reliable, coordinated, and agile control bodies to ensure that the outcomes of their work have a high impact on strengthening the institutional abilities of the public administration.

2. Mainstreaming technology in the fight against corruption

The processes of modernization of the state implemented worldwide in recent decades have transformed the mechanisms by which governments operate and deliver their services to citizens. This is how technology has become an indispensable tool to face the different challenges confronted by public institutions.

The World Economic Forum (Foro Económico Mundial, 2019) suggests that technology is the main engine of change in the fight against corruption in two ways. First, because these tools have enabled new ways to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute corruption more effectively. And, secondly, because technology has made it possible for citizens to have new mechanisms to audit and exercise social control over administrative acts.

Based on the analyses and proposals of prominent leaders in the field, such as the Latin American Development Bank (CAF, 2019), Inter-American Development Bank (Engel *et al.*, 2018), and the OECD (OCDE, 2020), it is possible to identify three major areas with good practices and outstanding experiences in the use of technology to combat corruption. These are promotion of open government to strengthen social control, analysis of big data to detect anomalies, and blockchain to reduce the risks of irregularities.

a) Promotion of open government to strengthen social control

The wave of transparency that democracies experienced during the first decades of this century has raised the standards and expectations of citizens in terms of access to public information (Naser *et al.*, 2018; OEA, 2013). For this reason, their mere dedication to citizens today is insufficient if people do not have the mechanisms to participate in political decision-making.

The use of technology is an indispensable tool to advance transparency, strengthen access to public information, increase citizen participation and improve accountability.

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In this scenario, the open government has emerged as an opportunity to strengthen the work of democratic institutions. From a theoretical point of view, this is proposed as a new paradigm, which seeks to expand the public sphere through the promotion of a more transparent, participatory, and collaborative civil service (Kaufman & Oszlak, 2014). Thus, the use of technology appears as an essential tool to advance transparency and access to public information, citizen participation, accountability, and innovation within organizations (Ramírez-Alujas, 2019).

Specifically, international recommendations on the matter establish that progress should be made in standardizing and simplifying administrative processes, eliminating irrelevant procedures that do not add value, and using computer means to digitize and automate procedures. In this area, there is a certain consensus on the usefulness for governments to adopt and implement the standards defined by the Alliance for Open Government and the OECD to consolidate a modern state that, through technology, boosts social control and enables the strengthening of anti-corruption processes (CAF, 2019; Engel *et al.*, 2018; Naser & Ramírez-Alujas, 2014).

Box 3.3: Adoption of good open data practices to strengthen transparency

The International Open Data Charter (Carta Internacional de Datos Abiertos, 2015) establishes six principles that public sector institutions should consider in setting the standards by which they should publish data:

1. **Open by default:** aims to change the general logic in which the bodies currently operate, to provide for the publication of all the institution's data and justify the cases in which they will be kept closed.
2. **Timely and comprehensive:** through the publication of relevant information, quickly and completely.
3. **Accessible and usable:** so that the data is readable by other systems and published in an open-licensed format.
4. **Comparable and interoperable:** targeting high quality data sets and commonly accepted standards.
5. **For improved governance and citizen engagement:** allowing the population to know what the authorities and civil servants are doing.
6. **For inclusive development and innovation:** promoting participatory economic development.

International organizations have highlighted open data strategies or action plans developed by Ireland and Poland to promote the adoption of these principles.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020).

b) Analysis of big data to detect irregularities

The growing and accelerated development of information technologies have made possible the emergence of a new branch of knowledge: big data. Processing and analysis of large volumes of data to identify patterns, correlations, and/or irregularities, are used in different tasks, among them, the fight against corruption (OCDE, 2019).

One of the most recognized cases in this matter is the use of red flags to detect irregularities. This methodology, which emerged in the field of risk management, has been replicated and adapted for the use of technology, obtaining outstanding experiences worldwide. Specifically, these flags are used to determine the robustness of investment projects, analyze and investigate public procurement contracts and decide pre-emptive measures in the areas or sectors mainly exposed to cases of corruption (OCDE, n.d.-b). All these experiences are based on predictive

analyses, which, grounded on institutional databases, allow early identification and recognition of possible cases of probity violations.

Based on the above, international recommendations mention these types of tools as efficient mechanisms to strengthen the detection and investigation of irregularities. However, at the same time, they recognize that it is currently essential to increase and improve the infrastructure and skills of public institutions to perform predictive analytics grounded on big data. Only in this way will it be possible to deepen these types of methodologies and apply them in areas other than public procurement (CAF, 2019; Engel *et al.*, 2018; Penagos & Hernández, 2019).

Box 3.4: Recommendations for increasing the use of data analysis in the fight against corruption

To advance in the consolidation of institutional abilities and to comply with the principles of the G20 (2015) on strengthening the use of data to fight corruption, Transparency International has established 5 recommendations, namely:

1. **To make better use of open data to fight corruption:** integrating open data policies with anti-corruption strategies, removing institutional barriers to facilitate cooperation and coordination between anti-corruption institutions, and promoting the timely publication of databases in open formats.
2. **To invest in skills, technology, and technical and administrative abilities to facilitate the use of data in the fight against corruption:** establishing training for the entire public administration and involving citizens to determine the priorities for the use and application of data analysis to fight corruption.
3. **To raise awareness of the benefits of using data to fight corruption:** by developing opportunities to disseminate these matters and participating in and collaborating with multisectoral initiatives to promote the use of data.
4. **To foster a culture of transparency and openness at all levels:** establishing incentives and administrative reforms to promote the publication of administrative information in open data.
5. **To strengthen the link between access to information and open data:** enacting laws and regulations that establish openness by default and the publication of data in open licenses at the national level.

Source: Transparency International (Transparencia Internacional, 2017c).

c) Incorporation of blockchain techniques in the fight against corruption

The blockchain is a computer security system, so far immutable, which saves the information entered in closed blocks that cannot be modified later. Since what is stored cannot be altered, a much more transparent and reliable system is configured for the different stakeholders (Kossow & Dykes, 2018; Engel *et al.*, 2018; OCDE, 2017b).

This technology essentially corresponds to a tamper-proof recording of activities through a time stamp verified by the distributed computer network, where the data becomes immutable after processing, as it does not reside on a particular computer (Preukschat, 2019). For this reason, blockchain can be extremely useful in areas such as payments and public procurement, as it prevents tampering with bids after the transaction has taken place. Likewise, changes in the specifications of public tenders are prohibited, because they could adapt them to the characteristics of certain interested companies, and also because it preserves the information provided by the whistleblowers without the possibility of adulteration (Chile Transparente, 2020).

There are currently more than 200 cases in the international arena in which this technology is employed, however, there are no consolidated studies that show the impact of its use in anti-corruption processes. Consequently, it is convenient to implement it in new areas to evaluate its results and advantages in the fight against corruption.

Although technology presents multiple opportunities and benefits to combat corruption, it is not exempt from risks, such as the implication of cryptocurrency in crimes such as money laundering (Transparencia Internacional, 2017a). This, considering that this digital means of exchange facilitates anonymity, which makes it difficult to investigate the identity of the individual after certain movements. The incorporation of these technological tools have multiple benefits but also risks, which requires legislative changes aimed at preventing new forms of corruption.

In this sense, the international experience (Kossow & Dykes, 2018; Aliyev & Safarov, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2020a) teaches us not to consider the blockchain as a magic solution, since it is necessary to strengthen institutional capacities before applying it effectively, and more evidence is needed to demonstrate its contribution to strengthening public integrity.

Box 3.5: Experiences of Georgia, Sweden, and Jordan in the application of blockchain

Although the blockchain was developed in 2008, currently, some countries already have pioneering experiences in the application of this technology. The following are some cases that have aimed to strengthen the operation of governments, reducing the risk of irregularities.

1. **Land registry in Georgia:** after a process of more than 10 years of modernization and digitization of its processes, the government launched a project to design and administer a public registry of land property rights based on blockchain. This experience has made it possible to register land rights through an immutable registry through data encryption. Thus, citizens' access to secure systems was increased and the risks of fraud were reduced (GIZ, n.d.).
2. **Real estate transactions in Sweden:** the registration processes for property rights and mortgages involve multiple entities such as banks, brokers, and notaries. This resulted in slow, costly processes that were highly exposed to fraud. In 2018 the Swedish agency in charge of these registrations completed a pilot project for the application of the blockchain in these matters. Although the results were positive, it became clear that progress needed to be made on new contract legislation, improving digital signatures and other aspects related to strengthening the fully digital operation of registration systems (ICA, 2016).
3. **Syrian Refugee Food Assistance Registry in Jordan:** the United Nations Refugee Agency implemented a complete set of tools to collect biometric data for refugee access to humanitarian assistance. The processing has been developed through blockchain, safeguarding the personal information of more than 100,000 refugees linked to this project (World Food Programme, 2020).

These experiences are still too recent to conclude that they are successful applications of this technology; however, they exemplify good practices that should be studied in depth in order to be implemented in the field of fighting against corruption.

Source: Aarvik (2020).

Technology is a tool that has had a remarkable impact on the modernization processes of states (World Economic Forum, 2019; Naser *et al.*, 2017). However, although the incorporation of technological tools represents a great opportunity to strengthen the fight against corruption, we must not lose sight of the fact that their incorporation is a means and not an end in itself. Thus,

the strengthening of open government to prevent irregularities, the intensive use of data analysis to detect fraud, and the incorporation of the blockchain into processes are means that will support governments in favor of social control, improving their work methods and optimizing their processes. This shows that the fight against ethical violations is only possible through the strengthening of the abilities of public institutions, where technology plays a central role.

3. Reducing barriers and increasing spaces for citizen participation

Currently, it is necessary to reduce the costs of citizen participation and increase the relationship mechanisms between institutions and people.

Citizen participation has become a predominant theme within public management (Montecinos & Contreras, 2019). In a progressive but systematic way, governments around the world have created more and more spaces to increase citizen participation and deliberation concerning public affairs (Ramos, 2017). At the same time, this is a trend aligned with the main international conventions that promote social control as a powerful tool to strengthen integrity (OCDE, n.d.-c; OEA, 1996; ONU, 2004).

In one study (Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001), the World Bank noted that there is a positive correlation between the level of citizen participation and the control of corruption. Therefore, the greater the involvement of people in the fight against breaches of probity, the better the management of bad practices, since there is a workforce interested in ensuring the care of public resources. This, in short, reduces the margins of discretion and eventual abuse in decision-making and increases demands for accountability from the authorities.

International experience shows that the best dynamics of participation aim in two directions. First, to decrease the costs for people to get involved, and second, to increase the mechanisms through which institutions relate to their stakeholders. The recommendations and good practices associated with each of these points are discussed in greater depth below.

a) Reducing the costs associated with citizen participation

In a democratic regime, elections are the main mechanism of political participation in the institutional system. They have the advantage of not involving a high cost for citizens, which enables a large number of individuals to make their voices heard in these processes. However, the frequency of voting is not high and this

makes it difficult for people to have permanent and deep social control over their representatives.

Given the above, complementing the vote with other participation mechanisms makes it easier for citizens to learn about and influence the systematic operation of the Administration. However, such non-electoral opportunities represent a greater cost for people and also require the coordinated action of a large group of individuals (CAF, 2019).

In this context, good international practices aim to reduce the costs of participation for individuals. Thus, for example, it is recommended to reduce the barriers that citizens face in their relations with the Administration. Some examples are:

- The use of clear language makes it easier for users to understand what is being communicated, otherwise they could be prevented from accessing the institutions. An outstanding experience is the Chilean Plain Language Network (Red de Lenguaje Claro Chile, n.d.) made up of 7 bodies committed to promoting initiatives that facilitate communication between the state and the citizens. Similarly, in Argentina, a group of public institutions have launched the Plain Language Network of Argentina (Red de Lenguaje Claro Argentina, n.d.) to foster the right to understand. Finally, as of 2018, and with the same previous objective, the National Plain Language Network was created in Colombia (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2019).
- The simplification of the forms for making consultations or accessing information by reducing the mandatory fields and the personal data requested. In this sense, the OECD (OCDE, 2020) highlights as good practices the *de facto* anonymity contemplated in the United Kingdom and Canada to obtain public information.

Reducing time to access information makes it easier for citizens to receive a prompt response to their concerns from the Administration. Good practices are observed in the short periods established by law for these purposes in Estonia: 5 days, Portugal: 10 days, while in Finland and Poland: 15 days (OCDE, 2020). In addition to the time and information that people must

The international trend is to move from situational participation mechanisms, focused on specific points of the institution, to tools of structural collaboration.

provide when dealing with the administration, there are social costs involved in participation, which are especially detrimental in anti-corruption mechanisms (CAF, 2019). For example, threats or reprisals experienced by those who report irregularities are a deterrent that undermines the effectiveness of the fight against dishonest practices. In our continent, a study by Corporación Latinobarómetro, indicates that 33% of whistleblowers in Latin America suffered some kind of reprisal in the coming months (CAF, 2019).

To address this situation, international recommendations focus on two tracks. First, to move towards comprehensive systems for whistleblowers protection –which is detailed in point 5 of this chapter– and, second, changing the negative connotations associated with reporting irregularities. This second point is relevant in Latin America, where only 60% of respondents say it is socially acceptable to report. This is especially critical in Chile, where this number drops to 43% (Transparencia Internacional, 2017b). Improving this situation mainly aims at a cultural change, which requires comprehensive and long-term mechanisms that include training actions, civic education, communication campaigns, among others.

Box 3.6: Good practices for changing the negative connotations of whistleblowing in Canada, the UK, the Netherlands and Mexico

In some cultures, whistleblowing can be associated with situations of disloyalty or betrayal to the collective sense. For this reason, many countries have developed communication strategies aimed at changing the negative connotations of warning about cases of corruption.

1. **Netherlands:** in Dutch, the concept of one who alerts has been replaced by that of a bell ringer –*Klokkenluider*– that evokes those people who in the past rang a bell to signal an imminent danger to the community.
2. **Mexico:** Similar to the previous case, the concept of *alertador* has been used to reduce the negative and legal burden of the term whistleblower.
3. **Canada:** The Public Interest Alert Commission designed a communication strategy to promote the message: “Make a change with a call. Be a hero for the public interest”.
4. **UK:** A Cardiff University study showed how the enactment of the Public Interest Reporting Act, which provides incentives for those who report, significantly changed the view of those who report cases of corruption in the media.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020).





The technology mentioned in point 2 of this chapter plays a central role in the good practices indicated in this section. The intensive use of social media or encrypted platforms to protect those who report it reduces the costs associated with participating and makes it easier for citizens to engage in the fight against corruption.

b) Increased mechanisms and influence of citizen participation

From a theoretical perspective, the international trend is to move from situational participation mechanisms focused on specific points in the institution to structural collaboration tools that increase impact of people on the full cycle of public policy (Carrión, 2015). Through this modality, the population can directly influence decision-making processes. This generates more inclusive and innovative policies that are linked to the needs of citizens and, at the same time, reduces discretion, favors accountability, and increases transparency.

In this sense, the OECD (OCDE, n.d.-d) has shown how, in recent years, governments have moved from less direct forms of participation such as citizens' meetings with non-binding conclusions, to other structural mechanisms such as participatory consultations with binding results or citizens' committees with the power to define certain issues. The following table mentions some measures to involve the population transversally in each of the phases of anti-corruption public policies:

Table 3.1: Citizen participation mechanisms





PARTICIPATION PHASE	DESCRIPTION OF INITIATIVES
 Agenda setting	Mechanisms designed to promote participation through easily accessible channels and the inclusion of consultations to gather information that allows the identification of citizens' priorities in the fight against corruption. An example of this are surveys or questionnaires through which people can prioritize which anti-corruption measures seem to be more important than others.
 Policy development	Measures that promote participation in the design of anti-corruption tools. It seeks to focus the means of participation in traditionally excluded groups, for example, facilitating the grouping of people in those sectors where organization can be difficult.
 Policy implementation	Cases in which institutions execute policies in a collaborative manner with the communities, while at the same time enabling mechanisms for accountability, to facilitate the follow-up and control of the state of implementation to the citizens.
 Policy evaluation	It complements the internal evaluation processes with mechanisms provided by civil society that enable the gathering of relevant information on the functioning and implementation of anti-corruption measures.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020).

Among the cases mentioned in this table, the way in which citizens can exercise tasks of control or monitoring of civil service attracts special attention from academia and institutions (Castillo & Villavicencio, n.d.; Chêne, 2012; Lagunes, 2017; OCDE, 2014b; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000). Table 3.2 indicates the

main practices through which citizen monitoring is promoted at the international level, and table 3.7 presents two outstanding international experiences in this regard.

Table 3.2: Citizen monitoring mechanisms

INSTRUMENT	DESCRIPTION
 Information campaigns	These strategies seek to stimulate citizen participation by providing detailed information to the population about any provision or service they receive. On some occasions, these campaigns are accompanied by instructions on how to monitor the operation of these public policies.
 Performance charts	These mechanisms promote the involvement of citizens in the proper functioning of the administration, through the generation of information on the performance of a public policy or entity. For this purpose, instances of interaction between citizens and organizations are designed and implemented, which allow us to learn about the population's perception and satisfaction with the program. As a result of these interventions, action plans are generated to resolve the weaknesses identified.
 Audit reports	These actions are described as systematic processes in which a group of people from civil society is organized to carry out a detailed evaluation of the progress of any entity or public policy, in order to verify its proper functioning. In this scenario, public institutions should only have the role of delivering the requested information to facilitate social control. These mechanisms are more complex and expensive, since they require a high degree of knowledge about the object to be analyzed, access to detailed information, and a large investment of time by the team responsible.
 Claims management mechanisms	These initiatives seek to strengthen the impact of citizens in the proper functioning of the public sector by reducing the costs associated with requests or complaints to the institutions. For this, the grouping of similar claims is promoted, so that people face the entity in a coordinated manner and penalties are imposed against those servants who fail to comply with the requirements.

Source: Carella et al. (2017).

Box 3.7: Social audits in Colombia and Costa Rica

Social audits have become effective control tools that civil society organizations use to prevent, detect and investigate possible cases of corruption. The following are two internationally recognized good practices:

1. **Social Audit Program in Colombia:** In 2008, the Colombian Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission initiated this program so that communities impacted by far-reaching projects could audit the use of public resources associated with the mitigation measures involved. To this end, the program includes three stages. First, socialization actions are developed to invite citizens to an informative meeting about the project, then a group of people interested in monitoring public funds is formed and, finally, the investment of the funds is followed up.
2. **Guide for Citizen Audit in Costa Rica:** The Judicial Branch is currently making a manual available to facilitate audits of any process or project in this sector by civil society groups. Its objective is to promote the active collaboration of the officials responsible for the procedure celerity. To this end, it identifies good practices on how to optimize the delivery of documentation and specific recommendations on formats and deadlines for its implementation.

Source: Single Portal of the Colombian State (Portal Único del Estado Colombiano, 2020) and the Judicial Branch of Costa Rica (Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, n.d.).

In conclusion, it is possible to identify general principles that international experience highlights as key to strengthening citizen participation (CAF, 2019; Transparencia Internacional, 2019b). In this sense, citizen participation mechanisms should:

- **Present relevant and clear information.** Initiatives must be based on the delivery of understandable, accessible information and on secure means that respond to the needs of specific populations, to increase their impact on the community.
- **Strengthen the link between organizations, their workers, and the population.** Entities must increase the spaces for interaction between citizens, providers, civil servants, and authorities, reducing the cost of getting involved in these activities for people and increasing their impact on institutional functioning.
- **Act purposefully.** One way to reduce participation costs is to provide spaces for training and specific education to the population that is involved in participatory instances. Similarly, institutions should ensure that their mechanisms promote diversity in citizen participation.
- **Be safe and reliable.** The mechanisms must guarantee the protection of those who participate as a way of reducing the risks of reprisals or threats for getting involved in high-impact matters.

- **Start with the commitment of authorities.** The impact of citizen participation on the performance of organizations will be strengthened if there is a clear and permanent commitment from their authorities to transform the suggestions of the population into actions for institutional improvement.

4. Strengthening people's ethical behavior

People play a key role in fighting against corruption; raising their standards of ethical behavior is key to strengthening integrity.

Individuals are critical actors in the fight against corruption. This has been studied from multiple theoretical perspectives (Köbis *et al.*, 2015; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; OCDE, 2009; Transparencia Internacional, 2017b), which conclude that the best anti-corruption practices will face a major obstacle if the population does not commit to acting ethically in their work, family and personal lives. Based on this, this section analyzes and highlights different initiatives that seek to raise the standards of honest behavior in people of different spheres.

In the first place, it highlights how education and job training opportunities can, through the development of skills and attitudes, structure an ethical environment within organizations. It then discusses the importance of raising awareness and socializing the fight against corruption in people's daily work and, finally, presents some new theoretical perspectives that could be an innovative contribution to how organizations face this challenge.

a) Capacity building to elevate ethical behavior

There is currently an institutional consensus on the relevance of training mechanisms in strengthening organizational integrity (Lima Commitment, 2018). At the same time, this has been researched (Kaptein, 2015; Ritter, 2006; Warren *et al.*, 2014), with results that highlight the impact of job training activities on the ethical environment of entities. In the same vein, at the national level, within the 236 measures proposed by the Engel Commission (Anti-Corruption Council, 2015) more than twenty recommended increasing training in both the public and private sectors, which also reflects the importance of this subject.

At the international level, capacity building processes pursue three main goals in the fight against corruption:




- To improve the knowledge about corruption and probity of the members of an institution. This enables them to recognize

acts that undermine probity, what they should do about them, and how they can contribute to the creation of a structure that fosters integrity.

- The development of skills that promoting concrete managing practices to encourage subordinates and peers to consolidate a culture of institutional integrity.
- Strengthen anti-corruption attitudes so that the members of the organization assume an active and permanent commitment to prevent, report and recriminate bad administrative practices.

The organizations address each of the aforementioned axes through various teaching methods. Table 3.3 is a proposal presented by the OECD (OCDE, 2020) on the different formats of training activities that can be implemented for the development of skills among the members of an institution.

Table 3.3: Integrity training activity formats

 Activity type	 Methodological approach	 Description
Conference	Rule-based	Course in conference format on integrity and administrative processes. Participation mainly of the trainers.
E-learning module	Rule-based	Online courses on integrity and administrative processes.
Coaching and mentoring	Combination of rule and value approaches	Officials and managers have the opportunity to interact with some proven conduct that will create ethical awareness within the institution.
Case studies and debate on ethical dilemmas	Combination of rule and value approaches	Through the case study, officials are expected to identify the problems of integrity and ethics presented, and what the best mechanisms to address and manage them are.
Role play	Based on values	Civil servants are asked to simulate certain scenarios to observe the behavior they would have in reality.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020).

It is possible to conclude that training must present two conditions to increase its impact. First, it must be focused and segmented on the needs of the organization's members; consequently, it is necessary to offer differentiated activities, depending on whether they are managers, professionals, or administrators. Secondly, it is recommended that the training instances are not limited to the transfer of information from a speaker to a recipient audience, but that they be moments of reflection and discussion regarding the ethical dilemmas and integrity risks commonly faced by employees; this is the so-called ethical training, which allows for the alignment of personal values with institutional values (Chêne, 2014).

Box 3.8: Good practices for anti-corruption training in the public and private sectors

In the international arena, there are multiple cases of capacity building to strengthen a culture of integrity. Below are featured experiences:

1. **Public sector:** in recent years, countries such as Canada, the United States, Lithuania and Turkey have made ethics training mandatory for those who join the state administration. In this respect, the Belgian Government's Public Servants Agency provides training in integrity dilemmas for its officials through practical mechanisms that encourage ethical discussion and reflection on how to resolve them. In the United States, the Office of Government Ethics has developed a site with useful resources and tools for each institution to develop training tailored to its own reality.
2. **Private sector:** since 2015, the German Society for International Cooperation –GIZ for its initials in German– has implemented the global initiative "Alliance for Integrity" to support companies in the development and strengthening of their corruption prevention mechanisms through practical solutions and effective tools. One of their focuses of work is training, through a program called "from companies to companies," in which experts from large corporations assist these in the development of mechanisms to strengthen a culture of organizational integrity.

Source: OECD (OCDE, n.d.-c).

b) Citizen awareness on the value of integrity

As presented in this chapter, citizens play a central role in the fight against corruption. For this reason, it is relevant to create mechanisms that promote each individual and society as a whole to adopt a commitment in this struggle and decisively punish breaches of integrity.

As a theoretical starting point, it is important to understand that corruption is a phenomenon that originates in the mind, rather than a behavioral, regulatory, or financial phenomenon (Brioschi, 2004). This means that individuals measure their behavior from the collective context in which they find themselves rather than from the true economic value that they can place on themselves. Thus, if someone perceives that everyone is incurring violations of probity, he is likely to give in as well, as moral responsibility decreases. By having a population that condemns corruption in all its forms and scope, it is expected that fewer people will risk committing a corrupt act, as they would face moral punishment, which can often be more imposing socially than a monetary or

criminal sanction. There lies the importance of being able to raise awareness of these matters among citizens (Köbis *et al.*, 2015).

The following table presents three factors that, according to international experience, are essential to reinforce the awareness and commitment of citizens in the fight against corruption:

Table 3.4: Indispensable factors for advancing citizen awareness

Level of knowledge about corruption	The degree of instruction that an individual has on the phenomenon could determine his or her attitude towards irregularities or crimes of corruption. For example, if a person does not know that paying to speed up a procedure is a crime, he be unlikely to take any specific action to deal with it.
Corruption tolerance level	The level of moral flexibility that individuals have in the face of certain ethical breaches could favor the establishment of justifications that reduce the negative burden of acting incorrectly in the face of integrity dilemmas and encourage them to commit irregularities.
Prevailing social norms	Commonly accepted customs work as an ethical anchor to which individuals resort to justify the decisions they make. In that sense, if social norms do not decisively penalize violations of probity, they become ethical incentives for people's bad behavior.

Source: CAF (2019).

The most successful international practices propose to increase the level of knowledge on corruption and aim to develop cross-cutting training actions for social groups, which should begin in schools. Thus, the OECD (OCDE, 2018a), through its "Education for Integrity" initiative, highlights the importance of creating opportunities for teaching about this scourge in school curricula, since teaching young people builds a foundation that they will maintain until adulthood.

Box 3.9: Anti-corruption education experiences in Austria, Hungary, and South Korea

Following good practices to increase the level of knowledge about corruption from childhood, many countries have incorporated the relevance of ethical values and integrity, the impact of violations of probity and the importance of the rule of law into their curricula. Below are some highlighted practices:

1. **Austria:** to promote training processes about integrity in the public sector, since 2015, training activities have been carried out for teachers to commemorate the anti-corruption day in their schools, with practical and daily dynamics.
2. **Hungary:** during the last two school years, students are required to take courses on the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Studies have shown their impact when the methodologies used consider cases from their own country.
3. **South Korea:** it has incorporated technologies into its training processes, so that students can analyze the impact of corruption through the use of online platforms and video games.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2018a).

Along with training processes, awareness campaigns are useful tools to manage and decrease corruption tolerance towards violations of integrity standards. In the international arena, it is important to develop multiple communication strategies with a strategic and long-term perspective that will reduce corruption tolerance.

Box 3.10: Hong Kong's strategy to bring about a change in corruption tolerance of citizens

Hong Kong is an example of how a well thought out socialization process generates great cultural changes. It went from being one of the communities with the most corruption to being located at number 16 of the ranking of Transparency International (Transparencia Internacional, 2019a), through a plan whose fundamental idea was to develop a sense of duty as a citizen.

Hong Kong's strategy is based on 3 principles:

- **Simplicity:** by delivering a long-term anti-corruption plan that could be understood by the general public.
- **Deterrence:** by understanding that prevention is one of the fundamental pillars for any anti-corruption strategy.
- **Trust:** educating citizens as a fundamental and cross-cutting element of society.

These principles served as the basis for a process of social change, which was accompanied by the rebirth of the feeling of trust among citizens, that they will not commit corrupt acts and will report any irregularity they see.

Source: Hsieh (2017).

Establishing social norms that allow for the organization of a community that values and takes responsibility for strengthening integrity is a task that transcends governments. Thus, international recommendations highlight the role of the private sector, academia, organized civil society, among others, in making the fight against corruption visible, socializing it and consolidating it (OCDE, 2018b; UNODC, n.d.; World Economic Forum, 2020b). In this sense, it is essential that the different sectors of society become involved in eradicating bad practices through proactive initiatives that guide the prevailing social norms towards the values and principles of probity.

Box 3.11: commitment of civil society to make integrity visible in Argentina

In 2017, a group of women from different private and state-owned enterprises in Argentina created the Women in Compliance network, in order to share their knowledge and experiences in compliance, ethics, integrity and transparency among the participants. This organization aims to make visible, share, train and disseminate good ethical, inclusive and sustainable practices that strengthen a culture of integrity in Argentina. The initiative has no representatives and is based exclusively on the voluntary and coordinated work of the more than 170 associates that currently make up the organization.

This network has been internationally recognized for its contribution to making the fight against corruption visible, its commitment to raising ethical standards in society, and collective action through coordinated work with the public and private sectors.

Source: Women in Compliance Argentina (n.d.).

c) Incorporation of new approaches to guide ethical behavior

The use of proposals and experiences from behavioral economics to generate changes in people, in order to promote honest and upright behavior, is a trend in vogue, both at the institutional (Afif, 2017; European Commission, 2017; OCDE, 2018b) and academic levels (Graff, 2015; Sunstein, 2014; Wiltermuth, 2011).

This trend questions the model of rational choice on which classical economics is based. In simple terms, it states that human beings make decisions motivated by external factors –such as cultural patterns or emotional elements– that influence their choices. This means that they do not always prefer the option that maximizes their well-being. In this context, behavioral economics argues that organizations could guide individuals to make better decisions through nudges (Ariely, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Güemes, 2017).




In recent years, both the OECD (OCDE, 2018b) and the World Bank (Banco Mundial, 2018) and the Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, n.d.) have promoted that governments encourage public policies based on the principles of behavioral economics, to stimulate people to make better decisions that maximize social welfare. Applied to the area of

combating corruption, these recommendations would make it possible to address the issues mentioned in the previous point, such as the need to decrease tolerance for ethical inefficiencies and to modify those social norms that are averse to a culture of integrity.

International experience shows the potential of behavioral economics principles to modify social norms and the psychological biases that would explain the apathy of individuals in the face of irregularities (CAF, 2019). In this sense, the application of certain nudges could promote a more active attitude on the part of the citizenry, by lowering the barriers that make people's reactions more complex or by increasing the incentives to report irregularities.

The following table indicates six tools of behavioral economics to guide the behavior of citizens.

Table 3.5: Behavioral economics tools

 Tool	 Description	 Example applied to the promotion of integrity
Default configuration	People are reluctant to take actions other than the usual ones. Consequently, organizations could put as pre-established options those they wish to promote among their members.	On the public procurement platforms, the predetermined incorporation of the framework agreement over other forms of contracting.
Reminders	Individuals are constantly exposed to a lot of information. So getting them to pay attention to key messages at precise timing can help them to act in accordance with socially accepted values.	Sending emails, throughout December, to remind them of the ban on accepting gifts from users and suppliers.
Framing	People perceive information very differently depending on how it is presented to them. Consequently, to communicate strategically the desirable behavior, you must highlight it, in order to modify their behaviors.	Replace messages like “30% of people do not report” by others that highlight the desired behavior “70% of people do report it.”
Simplification and greater convenience	Individuals are demotivated when faced with complex situations or processes. Therefore, simplifying the procedures that the organization wishes to promote increases the chances that the conduct will be carried out.	Simplify the forms through which a citizen can file a report for corruption.
Games	People enjoy playing. Hence, playful actions or processes that incorporate rewards or incentives are motivators of human behavior.	Incorporation of playful mechanisms in training to promote people’s commitment.
Commitment	Individuals are more likely to act if they have made a commitment in the past. Thus, making commitments that change future behavior increases the likelihood that the desired behavior will occur.	Signing formal commitments, which oblige a person to alert of any irregularity they know of.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2018b).

Based on what is exposed in this section, it is recommended that public and private institutions study, evaluate and implement the theories and proposals that behavioral economics has developed. This could mean the incorporation of innovative techniques and tools to strengthen integrity, both at the organizational and individual levels.

Box 3.12: Incorporating nudges to report in Nigeria

Psychology has suggested that providing role models or behavior models can have positive effects when trying to change a prevailing behavior.

For seven months, members of a community in Nigeria were exposed to a film in which well-known actors used a recently released mobile app to inform authorities of acts of corruption. Another group of the population did not have access to these scenes and the difference was notable: the increase in complaints had an impact 1.7 times greater than a national campaign in the same sense and 78 more reports than the average were recorded during the course of public policy.

Source: CAF (2019).

Finally, it is important to reiterate the importance of people in the fight against corruption. International evidence shows that there are no magic bullets, no incorruptible processes. It is essential to promote training actions so that public officials have better skills and to raise citizens' awareness to increase their commitment to integrity. It is also necessary to constantly explore new ways to promote ethical behavior of individuals in particular and society as a whole.

5. Organization of comprehensive systems to promote the reporting of corruption

Throughout this book, the importance of creating conditions to encourage reporting the occurrence of irregularities has been reiterated and, at the same time, ensuring individuals effective mechanisms to avoid reprisals that harm their physical and/or psychological well-being.

This is particularly relevant in Latin America, where a large number of people decide not to report cases of corruption that they have witnessed for fear of the negative consequences that this might have on their work or daily lives (Transparencia Internacional, 2017b). In the Latinobarómetro 2018 survey, the variable “when you know of something corrupt, it is better to not get involved and stay quiet” presents answers with a similar dispersion between both trends: 35.3% of people agree with this statement, while 38.8% reject it (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2018).

To combat this phenomenon, international experience highlights the need to advance on three axes:

- The strengthening of social norms that value the reporting of breaches of integrity.
- The promotion of an open culture within organizations, and
- The establishment of a regulatory system that protects whistleblowers.

Considering that the first axis was analyzed in detail in point four of this chapter, the second and third axis will be examined below.

a) Promotion of an open organizational culture


In both the public and private sectors, it is relevant to promote a safe environment and a favorable environment so that people alert to any action or omission they detect that could affect institutional integrity. From a theoretical point of view, an open organizational

Corruption is a phenomenon that acts in the dark and feeds on the complicit silence of those who participate in it. Whistleblower protection is essential to break this complicit silence.

culture is characterized by ensuring all individuals a space to raise their concerns and the confidence to communicate their criticisms and ideas within the entity (OCDE, 2020). This is done through the organization of more horizontal hierarchical relationships, with cross-cutting interaction mechanisms and leaderships that promote the recognition of errors without reproach. This generates an environment conducive for the members of the organization to openly reflect on integrity and to identify possible irregularities.

The Recommendation on Public Integrity (OCDE, 2017b) encourages organizations to structure an open organizational culture through:






Image 3.1: Components of an open organizational culture



Source: Author prepared based on OECD (OCDE, 2020).

As shown in image 3.1, table 3.6 describes the essential elements for strengthening an open culture:

Table 3.6: Elements to promote an open culture

ELEMENTOS	DESCRIPCIÓN
 <p>Clear channels for reporting and follow-up</p>	<p>Offering access to confidential or anonymous consultations and reports facilitate alerting the occurrence or suspicion of ethical violations. Although these channels can be offered through different tools –digital forms, e-mails, mailboxes, telephone lines– what is relevant is that the reception of the report is accompanied by an explanation of the steps that will be followed to give a response, which favors trust and reduces the whistleblower’s uncertainty.</p>
 <p>Whistleblower protection</p>	<p>To assure those who report irregularities a complete protection system that prevents or corrects the occurrence of reprisals to encourage people to use reporting channels. For this reason, it is essential to protect the confidentiality of those who report irregularities, both within the organization and before external bodies, the media or society in general.</p>
 <p>Explicit prohibition of reprisals</p>	<p>Explicitly prohibiting formal or informal actions against the whistleblower reduces the sense of exposure generated by alerting the public to a case of corruption. In this regard, broad protection against discriminatory measures, such as dismissal, suspension, demotion, transfer, reassignment, and reduction of remuneration, among others, are highlighted as good practices.</p>
 <p>Effective complaint investigations</p>	<p>Trust in reporting channels is associated with the efficiency in solving the related investigations. In this sense, it is relevant that senior management demonstrate its concern to investigate and sanction the reported violations in a timely manner. At once, the organization must establish an organizational learning procedure in which the receipt of several similar consultations or reports are answered in a grouped and homogeneous manner. Finally, it must be ensured that the whistleblower knows the steps that will be followed during the investigation.</p>
 <p>Awareness measures</p>	<p>Dissemination activities and training on the operation of the reporting channels are key to ensure their effectiveness. For this purpose, information campaigns must be organized so that the entire institution knows the available mechanisms, their scope, operation and results.</p>

Source: Carella *et al.* (2017).

At the international level, some successful practices have been developed to promote an open culture within the organizations. Table 3.13 briefly presents the case of integrity advisors in the French public sector.

Box 3.13: Integrity advisors in France

In 2016, the law granting access to integrity advice for every public servant was enacted in France. For this purpose, ethics officers were appointed in all public organizations.

Ethics officials are required to advise public officials on integrity issues arising from their duties. This system has been extended to the different administrative regions of the country.

In 2019, the first activity report was published, which mentions the main trends in the area of advice and guidance provided to public officials, safeguarding the anonymity of the cases presented. In addition, these advisors also serve as a point of contact for reporting within the same institution.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020).

The establishment of management and administrative mechanisms, such as those indicated in this section, is essential to facilitate the identification of irregularities in the organization. However, such tools must be accompanied by a broad legal framework that protects whistleblowers beyond their organization.

b) Establishment of a protection system for whistleblowers





Laws and good practices to protect whistleblowers vary from country to country since they respond to the political, cultural, and administrative reality of each state. However, there is consensus about the need to move towards national systems that promote reporting acts of corruption and, at the same time, offer whistleblower protection mechanisms (OEA, 1996; ONU, 2004).

Based on the documents reviewed, it is possible to affirm that international best practices (OCDE, 2020; UNODC, 2016) point towards the regulation of five areas:

- **Scope:** areas, subjects, or levels in which the whistleblower protection standards apply.
- **Reporting mechanisms:** means through which informants can report the occurrence of irregularities or suspected corruption.
- **Protection measures:** resources that guarantee the whistleblower protection against reprisals.
- **Protection request mechanisms:** tiers to require the application of protection measures to ensure the personal integrity of the whistleblower.
- **Institutional managers:** entities responsible for implementing and ensuring the practical coherence of protection systems.

Along these lines, a recent study by UNODC (Von Söhnen, 2019) raises basic questions that should be answered by a good whistleblower protection framework and some challenges in the same sense. These are noted in table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Questions for designing a whistleblower protection framework

 Who should be protected?	<p>The trend is for regulatory frameworks to broaden the scope of their protection, including not only victims or witnesses, but also repentant offenders, journalists, hackers, among others.</p>
 Reporting channels	<p>It should have three channel levels:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal channels; • Administrative and/or criminal reporting institutions; and • External parties (media, social media).
 Protective measures	<p>There is a need for the following types of protection measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventive: to simplify the reporting channels, confidentiality and anonymity of the informant, clear investigation and follow-up policies, keep the subject updated, and implement data intelligence to put the focus of the evidence on the channel, not on the whistleblower. • Corrective: to implement civil and criminal protection for whistleblowers, compensate for damages they may suffer, establish penalties for those who carry out reprisals, reward a percentage of the amount recovered, and provide physical protection.
 Who should offer the protection measures?	<p>Three relevant actors can be identified in this regard:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorities in charge of receiving reports; • Special and independent authorities such as supreme audit institutions or whistleblower protection offices; and • Courts.

Source: Von Söhnen (2019).

As stated above, the answers to these questions vary from one country to another according to the reality of each institution. However, an OECD study (OCDE, 2016) allows us to identify the predominant international scenario in these matters. The following are the main characteristics of 32 OECD member countries analyzed in the report:

- 47% of the countries have a regulation to protect public officials; 41% have multiple statutes and 12% do not have any type of rule.

- Within the countries that have a statute, some of them extend their protection coverage beyond the public sector. Thus, 50% include protection for workers of supplier companies; 35% to external advisors and consultants; 35% to former workers; and 12% to interns and trainees of the organization.
- 85% of the countries have regulations to deter reporting complaints in bad faith.
- 59% of the countries establish mechanisms for receiving anonymous complaints.
- 56% of the countries carry out training and awareness activities on whistleblower protection.

Table 3.14 briefly presents the experience of the Netherlands on this matter.

Box 3.14: Whistleblower protection in the Netherlands

Today, the Netherlands has one of the world's most recognized whistleblower protection systems (OECD, 2020; Whistleblowers Authority, 2019). Its mechanism consists of three stages, with multiple channels to alert breaches of integrity:

1. **Internal complaints:** individuals are encouraged to raise their concerns or complaints through the mechanisms set up within each organization. In this sense, people are encouraged to alert their direct superiors, through the ethics advisor in the institutions or through internal channels of consultation and reports. As a result, a report is issued that could enable the individual to resort to a second or third instance.
2. **External complaints:** after the issuance of the internal report, in a second tier, and under situations explicitly determined by law, the resort to an external organization is allowed. Thus, individuals could appeal to higher supervisory authorities, to the investigation department of the national police, or to financial intelligence institutions. In specific situations, direct request to external entities is allowed, for example, when the facts compromise the senior management of the institutions.
3. **Complaints to the Whistleblower Protection Office:** this institution functions as a third instance when there is no adequate external body or when situations are exceptional. This entity can directly conduct investigations, provide protection measures and legal and psychological advice to the whistleblowers.

Source: OECD (OCDE, 2020) and Whistleblowers Authority (2019).

Corruption is a phenomenon that operates in the dark and thrives on the complicit silence of those who participate in it. For this reason, the establishment of broad and comprehensive systems that support those who break this silence is a key mechanism for strengthening the processes of fighting ethical violations.

The international practices outlined in this chapter shape the standards for an integrity system; countries should aim to achieve this benchmark involving various social actors.

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
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Chapter 4:

Pathways to strengthen integrity in Chile





PATHWAYS TO STRENGTHEN INTEGRITY IN CHILE


Throughout its history, Chile has had a tradition of administrative integrity that has been recognized both nationally and internationally (Silva, 2018; Agnic & Sierra, 2017; Orellana, 2007). However, in recent years, the discovery of several public and private irregularities has led to question this vision, increasing the corruption perceived among citizens and decreasing public trust in institutions (PNUD, 2019; Transparencia Internacional, 2020). This scenario has shown the need to reflect on the manifestations of this phenomenon in society from a broad historical perspective, and to advance in the development of better legal and administrative mechanisms to prevent the emergence of new cases of integrity violations.

Research on integrity and corruption are not recent in Chile. There are noteworthy studies that analyze these elements from the legal (Rajevic, 2013; Bermúdez, 2014; Barra, 2002), ethical (Orellana, 2007; Godoy, 1996; Binder, 2002), historical (Silva, 2018; Neely, 2010) and political (Muñoz, 2008; Solar *et al.*, 2008; Brescia, 2001) point of view.

While research on corruption has been diverse and permanent in recent times, the public policies implemented to address it have been isolated and sporadic. Thus, as can be seen in image 4.1, only four milestones have been identified in the development of wide-ranging state anti-corruption agendas over the last 30 years.

Today it is necessary to reflect on the manifestations of corruption from a broad historical perspective to identify better mechanisms to fight it.

Image 4.1: Anti-corruption agendas between 1990 and 2020



Source: Author prepared.

The initiatives presented in image 4.1 show two important ways corruption has been dealt with:

- 1) Public policies in this area have been the result of the work of technical advisory commissions or councils formed at the request of the Presidency of the Republic. All of these have had the purpose of generating a shared vision of the problem, proposing legal or administrative measures and recommending actions that can both preventively and correctively resolve the irregularities detected. This formula has allowed the design of anti-corruption measures to have a cross-cutting view, since it incorporates the different visions of the members of these commissions.
- 2) Each one of these instances was the institutional response to corruption scandals that drew the attention of citizens and reproach towards their leaders. Crises in which the questioning of public institutions increased and showed the urgent need to modernize state apparatus. This was the case in each of the four anti-corruption agendas presented:

- **Codelco case:** in January 1994, this corporation revealed the loss of US\$ 200 million, attributed to a company's executive, who received commissions of around US\$10 million from international brokers, in exchange for their operations in the futures markets. Years later, he was sentenced to eight years in prison for tax fraud (Revista Qué Pasa, 2014). To respond to this scandal, in April 1994, the National Commission of Public Ethics was created as an advisory body by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle.
- **Bonuses and MOP-Gate case:** in 2002, following a series of accusations about the payment of bribes and resource triangulation schemes to defraud the treasury in the ministries of Public Works and Transportation and Telecommunications, the payment of bonuses to ministers of state was revealed as an "old and well-known" practice (Herrera, 2003). To confront this crisis, in January 2003, the *political-legislative Agreement for the modernization of the State, transparency and the promotion of growth* was created.
- **Chiledeportes case:** between March 2005 and October 2006 a series of irregularities were disclosed in the Undersecretary of Sports, involving project awards by direct assignment to authorities of Chiledeportes, courses given to deceased persons or alleged money triangulations to finance political campaigns. To face criticism, the *Commission for the Strengthening of the Principles of Probity and Public Transparency* was created, reporting directly to the Presidency of the Republic.
- **Cases of irregular political financing:** between October 2014 and March 2015, the media reported multiple cases of irregular political campaign financing, which affected political parties and revealed a series of bad practices consisting of the issuance of fee schedules for services not rendered to reduce tax burdens and collect greater contributions for electoral campaigns. The response to this crisis was the creation of the *Presidential Advisory Council against Conflicts of Interest, Influence Peddling and Corruption*.

The fight against corruption requires the ability to add new insights and put the citizen's focus at the center of civil service.

The outcome of these efforts has resulted in 375 proposals for optimizing the operation of the public and private sectors (Figueroa, 2019). They range from improvements to the rules of operation of the public administration, models of political party financing, requirements and mechanisms for exercising senior public management, to resources to promote trust in financial markets and regulate land use.

Beyond an evaluation of the functioning of these strategies or the impact of the measures on the perceived corruption, the presence of these agendas as a direct result of media corruption scandals shows that a reactive logic has prevailed in the elaboration of state integrity policies in the country.

This vision is contrary to the main international recommendations promoted by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (ONU, 2004), the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OEA, 1996) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OCDE, n.d.-b). All these agreements, presented in chapter 1 of this book, promote the design, development, implementation and evaluation of long-term strategies that allow a comprehensive and multidisciplinary view of the phenomenon. A broader and forward-looking perspective is key to strengthening probity; only in this way, it will be possible to face the challenges of combating irregularities and resolve many of the gaps identified in this study.

Rethinking corruption, its meanings and relevance to democratic life, requires the ability to bring together different viewpoints, facilitate collective learning processes, internalize experiences and promote the implementation of concrete actions that place innovation, adaptability and citizen focus at the center of the civil service.

To address this challenge, this chapter seeks to comprehensively analyze the different perspectives, experiences, and issues noted throughout this book. We will reflect on the obstacles that the fight against corruption is currently facing, essential challenges to strengthen public integrity will be mentioned and some concrete measures will be presented to walk the path of consolidating a culture of probity in the country.

The conclusions and proposals in this section are the results of an analytical process, which considered the bibliographic review, the opinions and citizen concerns expressed in chapter 2, and the gathering of information from 8 managers of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and 5 representatives of different bodies that make up the Chilean integrity system mentioned in chapter 1.

As a result of this process, three challenges were identified that the discussion on strengthening public probity should address in the long term. First, the complexity of defining and identifying corruption cases that evolve and become increasingly sophisticated. Second, the existing duality in civil service between two spheres: politicians and bureaucrats –technocrats–; which generates two different fields of action to advance in the strengthening of integrity. Third, the need to manage what is public in a scenario of great uncertainty, in which social problems are dynamic, solutions are increasingly varied, and institutions must adapt their structures to respond to citizen's requirements. The chapter ends with an outline that allows us to visualize and understand the different essential ways to strengthen public probity in Chile.

1. Corruption and complexity: towards a change in logic

Corruption is a complex phenomenon to define. It has not been an easy task to set the limits to discern, in a consensual way, when we are facing a corrupt act, an unintended error or simply a lack of care in the actions of public servants. As explained in chapter 1, integrity and corruption may be approached from different perspectives, including economic, legal, sociological, moral and political ones, but without achieving content, margins and variables common to the problem.

One of the difficulties of generating a common concept is that, over time, the definitions are adapted to the interests of the actors that shape them, the historical and social circumstances in which they apply, and the cultural attributes that make up society. From these variations, different manifestations of corruption arise, some that are normalized, and others that are condemned. This analysis has shown that people associate different meanings to the same iniquitous act, depending on who is involved and the frequency of such behavior. The data collected in the citizen consultation show that it is considered a corrupt act to receive a benefit for being a relative of a public authority, but it is not condemned to the same degree when it is the person himself who performs a dishonest act to obtain an individual advantage. This produces a kind of paradox in which there is a false sense of own moral rectitude that is not replicable to the entire community. This exemplifies the obstacle to progress in the establishment of uniform concepts addressing violations of probity.

Despite these differences, there are common features. Today is clear that corruption is a public threat in constant evolution, whose capacity for mutation makes it impossible to predict its future transformations. This makes governments face the scourge with incomplete and often contradictory information, which causes quick obsolescence of their tools. Besides, there is need for public deliberation spaces to manage and contrast the different visions and ethical frameworks existing in society. Theoretically, this type of issue is called wicked problems or complex problems (OCDE, n.d.-a). From this conceptual perspective, it is understood the

necessity to solve this challenge through a systemic, coordinated and open vision that combines multiple approaches and considers the sociocultural context in which these controversies arise.

This requires moving towards a new logic in the design and implementation of public anti-corruption policies. Problems must be addressed with flexible and agile strategies, formulated after a multidisciplinary analysis that provides systemic and comprehensive solutions. To this end, three challenges must be addressed. First, it is important to explore, understand and delimit the phenomenon to tackle it in the best possible way; second, it is necessary to incorporate working tools and techniques that make it possible to address new forms of corruption effectively. Finally, it must move toward public policy solutions that deal with the various causes and consequences of this scourge. Each of these ideas will be developed below.

a) Promoting the generation of anti-corruption knowledge

One of the most striking results of the citizen consultation presented in chapter 2, refers to the self-perception of the participants about the phenomenon. When asked *how much do you know about corruption?*, 67.1% of respondents said they knew quite a bit or a lot, while only 5.1% said they knew little or nothing. This is not in line with the level of research on the subject in Latin America or in Chile, where there has been recognition of the limited academic development that issues such as corruption, ethics and integrity in the public sector have had over the past 20 years (Pliscoff, 2019). This situation poses the contradiction of having a population convinced of having a high level of knowledge on this scourge and an academic sector with a low intellectual production on the subject.

Can this show that public policies are being made based on a generalist knowledge rather than an expert or academic one? What have been the theoretical or technical foundations that have guided recent integrity agendas in Chile? Have the presidential advisory commissions privileged the citizen's vision over a specialized one? What are the main meeting spaces where decision-makers

Today it is essential to increase the meeting spaces between anti-corruption public policy makers and academia.

and academia share knowledge?¹ These questions are presented as an invitation to reflect on the technical or political emphasis the anti-corruption measures are having in the country and how this would affect their effectiveness.

To this end, it is essential to increase meeting spaces between anti-corruption public policymakers and academia. Only by generating scientific knowledge on how public administration works, institutional capacities and the phenomenon of corruption, it will be possible to attack this problem. The great challenge here is to ensure that there are universities, study centers or think tanks devoted to research about corruption and its impact on public life but also that this scientific perspective is connected to citizens and public entities. Only in this way will those who design, implement and evaluate public policies have better inputs and techniques to improve plans and programs to combat corruption. In this sense, international experiences, such as the Resource Center U4 Anti-Corruption in Norway, the Basel Institute of Governance in Switzerland, the Herti School of Governance in Germany, and the initiative Ethical Systems in the United States, could be replicated in Chile.

b) Promoting organizations committed to integrity

The complexity of preventing, detecting and investigating advanced forms of corruption translates into two practical situations that are difficult to address. On the one hand, its constant evolution and ability to adapt make it impossible to predict undesirable individual behavior and to establish appropriate preventive measures. On the other hand, the tools for building solutions are not ideal for dealing with the multiplicity of areas and moments in which irregularities occur, which poses the challenge of rethinking mechanisms and strategies.

¹ These questions have been addressed in a general way in the field of public policy by political scientist Patricio Silva (2010) in the text: *In the name of reason*.

Theoretically, there are two great paradigms to face corruption: the compliance perspective and through the model of integrity or values (Rohr, 1989; Jiménez, 2017; Huberts & Hoekstra, 2016). The current scene calls for creative solutions that complement and take full advantage of both streams. In line with chapter 3, it is clear that the avant-garde countries have embraced such guidelines and are no longer limited to sanctions to combat irregularities but have ventured new deterrents to bad behavior. Consequently, public and private organizations need to abandon their rigid bureaucratic structures to implement work methodologies that promote innovation and early adoption of the best procedures at a global level.

From the international review presented in the previous chapter, it appears that the coordination of flexible organizations connected to anti-corruption trends must consider two indispensable axes: the focus on people and the permanent incorporation of the technological tools available.

Focus on people: strengthening the ethical standard of the organization

Entities with high integrity standards are characterized by promoting instruments that guide the ethical actions of individuals over the corrective sanctions for bad actions. In this sense, those anti-corruption mechanisms that consider people's needs and attitudes seem to have better results, since they point to their intrinsic motivations (OCDE, 2020a). The organizational integrity systems that have emerged from academia (Huberts, 2018; Heywood *et al.*, 2017; Maesschalck, 2005) and that have been highlighted by multilateral agencies (OCDE, n.d.-b; INTOSAI, 2019; PNUD, n.d.) promote this trend and recommend the installation and support of prevention tools such as codes of conduct, internal consultation channels and permanent training to guide the good behavior of the members of an institution.

The focus on people and the incorporation of technology are key to building organizations committed to integrity.

Technology at the service of transparency and consolidation of integrity

Entities must incorporate suitable technological mechanisms into their processes and workflows. This can be translated, for example, into computer platforms that disclose institutional management through open data that facilitate social control. Some outstanding initiatives in this area are the Proactive Transparency website of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic –which goes beyond the rules of access to information under Law No. 20,285– and the Infobby site managed by the Council for Transparency and the Office of the Comptroller General –which publishes declarations of interests and assets as per Law No. 20,880–.

Likewise, new technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence and analysis through massive data could result in the prevention of irregularities. In this context, good practices mentioned in the previous chapter recommend their incorporation through an integral approach. This requires building up capacities of personnel for optimal use of such tools, the digitalization of processes as a starting point to promote an open government and to move towards a change in the logic of data, in which publicity of public information operates as a general rule and not as an exception.

In summary, the focus on the ethical behavior of people and the incorporation of technological means must be considered essential axes to advance towards integral organizations. The rapid advance of science and the permanent development of new anti-corruption tools demand that institutions committed to strengthening integrity, not only declare it, but are continually analyzing its context, identifying management trends and adding the best practices to their institutional work.

c) Incorporating a systemic vision in anti-corruption policies

The origin of corruption can be found in historical, political, economic, social, organizational and cultural elements. Corruption prevents the consolidation of democracy, reduces economic growth, diminishes interpersonal trust and favors dishonest

actions. To face corruption challenges, public policies on integrity requires inter-institutional and long-term coordination efforts, taking care of its diverse causes in a multidisciplinary manner.

A good example in this approach, mentioned in chapter 3, is the Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption. It promotes a long-term, holistic strategy aimed to generate a cultural change, favorable to public integrity. This cross-cutting action plan has been recognized as one of the reasons why this region currently has one of the best rankings in Transparency International (Hsieh, 2017).

Unfortunately, anti-corruption policies in Chile have not gone in this direction. A study of the characteristics, scope and impact of government efforts over the last 30 years concludes that they have focused exclusively on legal modifications, without a systemic vision for addressing the phenomenon (Muñoz, 2008; Arís *et al.*, 2020; Rehren, 2008; Manzur *et al.*, 2018). Between 1999 and 2016, there were at least 20 bills aimed at strengthening probity in the public sector, but initiatives aimed at integrity management in the public administration were limited and isolated (Lagos & Pliscoff, 2020). There is little evidence that a purely regulatory perspective may have a positive impact on institutional honesty levels.

As mentioned in chapter 1 and following Brinks *et al.* (2019), overregulation is an inappropriate response, increases opacity and leaves scope for ethics breaches. This would even promote compliance without effectiveness, causing an effect contrary to that intended, damaging the organizational capacity in the long term.

For the OECD (OCDE, n.d.-b), this cross-cutting and multidisciplinary perspective should be oriented on three axes –image 4.2–. First, to organize a coherent and complete system that establishes a strategy with clear objectives and priorities, responsibilities and well-defined rules that allow increasing the commitment of people at the political, managerial and operational levels. Second, to stimulate a culture of public integrity based on meritocracy, a environment of openness and dialogue, the strengthening of ethical leadership, and the involvement of society as a whole

to establish zero tolerance for corruption. Finally, to promote effective accountability that facilitates citizen participation in the development and implementation of anti-corruption programs, consolidates effective risk management mechanisms in public entities and strengthens the competencies of control bodies.

Image 4.2: OECD recommendation on public integrity (OCDE, n.d.-c).



Source: OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OCDE, n.d.-c).

In Chile, the UNCAC Anti-Corruption Alliance has contributed to the advancement in this new holistic approach to strengthening integrity countrywide. This collaborative work led since 2012 by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), brings together more than 30 institutions –public and private sector actors as

well as non-governmental organizations and the Academia—committed to promoting good practices to implement the principles of the United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention across the country. This coordination platform favors the development and implementation of different actions, such as proposals for regulatory changes, training, development of codes of ethics and recognition of highlighted integrity practices at a national level.

Despite the important achievements shown by the experience of the Anti-Corruption Alliance in this area, there is still a need to create and consolidate new and better meeting platforms for the actors involved in the fight against corruption. In this way, it will be possible to carry out coordinated work at the political and operational levels, to face this scourge with a long-term and comprehensive view.

As a result, the new forms in which corruption manifests itself require that public institutions move toward an effective strategy for confronting it. This logic must consider: a strong link between academia and the public sector, to study the phenomenon and seek appropriate solutions; the consolidation of a culture of integrity in public organizations; and the implementation of multidisciplinary policies that respond to these challenges.

2. The two faces of the problem: the duality between politics and the administration

Public administration aims to solve problems by providing goods and services to satisfy public needs. The government plays a key role in this task since it is the structure responsible for designing and implementing the rules, procedures, and mechanisms that allow this mission to be fulfilled.

Theoretically speaking, two worlds coexist within governments: politics and administration. Politics set the rules, values, ideals and goals that must be fulfilled throughout society, are established, the public administration develop policies, programs and procedures aiming to turn those rules, values, ideals and goals into specific decisions (Peters, 1999). In other words, "politics provides the objectives and administration provides the implementation" (Ramíó, 2017, p.13). In this context, it has been considered that the government should adequately coordinate a professional civil service body and keep a clear separation between the political sphere and that of the administration (Wilson, 1887; Innerarity, 2020; Asensio, 2018). In this combination, values and ideological perspective is attributed to the political level and the technical and objective competencies to the bureaucratic body.

In recent years, different states have undertaken reforms aimed at strengthening the balance between political and administrative groups. Dahlström and Lapuente (2018) identify three benefits of the separation of the two spheres in the government. First, it favors the organization of formal mechanisms of checks and balances, since politicians and bureaucrats obey two-tier accountability levels: politicians, to their constituents, and bureaucrats to the control bodies that each institution establishes. Secondly, the effectiveness of the government would be reinforced, since the labor stability of public employees would not be determined by their network of contacts, but by the fulfillment of their work, which in practice translates into an incentive to act appropriately. Thirdly, and following Miller (in Dahlström & Lapuente, 2018), the authors observe that it would increase the work efficiency of officials since

by not depending on politicians, public servants develop networks of trust with the high bureaucratic levels of the entities, which reinforces the commitment to the organization itself.

This theoretical perspective has an empirical correlation when analyzing the relevant differences that citizens perceive in the role, attitudes and behavior of public officials in comparison with the authorities. The National Public Opinion Study (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2019) states that 35% of citizens believe that almost all public officials are involved in corruption; this indicator rises to 50% when asked how many politicians are involved in such cases. Similar results were obtained in the online citizen consultation mentioned in chapter 2, where the action that was most severely sanctioned was: "That a benefit is given to someone because they are a relative of an authority", where 97% of those consulted said that this action was very or fairly corrupt.

This data shows how the political-administrative duality inherent to the public administration represents a major challenge to the development of an institutional approach to fighting against corruption. It is essential to move forward with the development of differentiated strategies to optimize the benefits of both worlds, but at the same time, reduce the risks they represent for the exercise of the public

Based on these two levels of analysis, below we present two ideas for strengthening public integrity, taking into account the characteristics and specificities of the political and administrative spheres.

a) Increase political commitment to integrity

Recent OECD recommendations state that any mechanism for combating corruption must begin with a clear, formal and ongoing commitment to integrity from the political levels and senior public managers (OECD, 2020a). This implies the existence of a coherent system that defines, supports and controls that integrity be a cross-departmental objective at the state level. It is assumed that organizations also take an active responsibility in managing

The duality between politics and the administration, which is inherent to civil service, represents a great challenge for the development of an institutionality that faces corruption.

integrity and set clear expectations about the ethical behavior required from high political levels.

In the case of Chile, this seems to be especially relevant, considering that, in several of the major corruption cases, which gave rise to modernizing agendas of the state, involved high-ranking public authorities: 2003 ministers and undersecretaries, 2006 heads of services, and 2015 politicians and candidates from various sectors.

Meanwhile, the entities whose authorities are elected by popular vote, as a whole, show high levels of citizen questioning. Indeed, the *National bicentennial survey* (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2020) reflects low levels of institutional trust, which is especially serious in those organizations with elected authorities: Municipalities – 17%, Government – 10%, and Congress – 1%. What is the country doing to address this situation? This is not an easy question to answer and, therefore, has probably only been answered tangentially in the most recent anti-corruption agendas.

In this context, it seems relevant to advance in the establishment of cross-cutting ethical guidelines for the political and managerial levels of the public sector and, on the other hand, to define clear rules that raise the standards regarding conflicts of interest and influence peddling.

Ethical guidelines for public sector authorities

The authorities and managers who lead the political or organizational processes must understand that their behavior is an example to be followed for the rest of the people, therefore their actions function as models for the other members of the entity (Thaler & Helmig, 2015; Treviño *et al.*, 1999; Vogel & Masal, 2015.) Hence the relevance of tone from the top in the organizational culture and in establishing a favorable environment for integrity. The *Public integrity handbook* of the OECD (OCDE, 2020a), based on a proposal by Treviño *et al.* (2000), recommends four key aspects for the establishment of ethical leadership at the managerial level:

- To be an ethical model to follow based on visible, concrete and systematic actions over time, which include both organizational and political communication processes.
- To demonstrate a commitment to sanction undesirable behaviors.
- To communicate and permanently highlight the relevant values and standards in a culture of integrity.
- To empower and promote trust between people inside and outside the organization, generating spaces for participation and involvement in decision-making processes.

Per the foregoing, it is relevant that, in addition to declaring their commitment to integrity, the authorities demonstrate their respect for the rules with concrete facts and actively promote the strengthening of ethical and civic values.

Advanced rules regarding conflicts of interest

International experience shows that one of the main challenges is the regulation of conflicts of interest and influence peddling, due to the sophisticated ways in which these irregularities occur, involving authorities from both the public and private sectors (Loewenstein *et al.*, 2011; Arís & Jaraquemada, 2019). In this regard, and as noted in chapter 1, multiple national reports (Alianza Anticorrupción, 2018; Chile Transparente *et al.*, 2019; Engel, *et al.*, 2018) have highlighted the need to establish clear rules that avoid the revolving door between the public and private sectors, as well as to deepen the regulation on inabilities and incompatibilities in the exercise of civil service and on abstention from potential conflicts of interest. In practice, these rules function as *ex-ante* control mechanisms that help prevent the emergence of irregularities that tarnish institutional integrity, increasing citizen distrust in their authorities.

The war against corruption is the fight to strengthen institutions.

b) Strengthen institutional capacities of the public administration

World Bank economist Daniel Kaufmann argues that the war against corruption is the struggle to strengthen institutions and combat the fragilities of the governance system (Bermell, 2019). This allows us to understand the importance of the public administration itself as a level technical application of standards and implementation of policies in integrity strengthening processes. In this same sense, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sets, as one of its global objectives, goal number 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions,” where the relevance that public sector organizations have in the fight against this problem is highlighted (ONU, 2015, p. 29). Similarly, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OEA, 1996) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (ONU, 2004), promote the development of integral mechanisms for forming high-level civil service bodies that improve the exercise of civil service.

The results of the citizen consultation presented online in chapter 2, are an important input for this analysis. When asked *which are the areas where corruption is most prevalent in Chile*, the vast majority of people are inclined to choose two options: public procurement (71.8%) and staff recruitment (65.3%), eleven points below being public works construction (54%). What is interesting about these results is that the first two areas mentioned are sectors common to public institutions, that is, all public entities develop procurement processes and select and recruit new members. Although Chile stands out internationally for its systems of procurement (BID, 2008; Lara, 2017; Meyer & Fath Meyer, 2012) and senior public management (Fraile, 2018; Echebarría *et al.*, 2006), these results should be an invitation to reflect on what the gaps are that still exist in these areas that generate these trends in citizen perception.

Improve public procurement processes

As already mentioned, public procurement processes are exposed to corruption risks due to the clash of public and private interests involved and the high amounts of public resources considered in this sector. In this sense and to reduce risks in this area, permanent and systematic processes must be developed to provide greater levels of transparency in the procurement of goods and services. It is also necessary to update the regulations on public procurement, considering the best standards in force, the results of internal control actions and the audit findings presented by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The provision of a registry of final beneficiaries or owners of companies as indicated in the commitments of the Financial Analysis Unit to the Open Government Alliance (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, 2019) may be an effective mechanism to provide greater levels of transparency to state procurement processes.

Refining people management policies

As mentioned in chapter 1, the processes associated with staff recruitment in the public sector are inherently exposed to breaches of integrity, as they are linked to highly risky processes such as the payment of salaries. These dangers are increased when combined with factors that aggravate these situations, such as the existing legal framework in the management of human resources in public entities and the opacity in the recruitment rules. To face this scenario, it is essential to rethink the personnel management mechanisms in the public sector in the long term and from a state level perspective. The establishment of a common civil service career system between the bodies of the administration, with clear and efficient rules for recruitment, selection, evaluation, and disengagement should be the starting point for this discussion. Only with better public servants will it be possible to strengthen the administrative and technical capacities of the institutions, thereby reducing the risks of corruption.

Anti-corruption control mechanisms should consider the combination of different levels of oversight and audit.

Strengthen control mechanisms

The final challenge in this area relates to the incentives that officials face to do their jobs well. It was mentioned earlier that, at the political level, these are related to the accountability that authorities have to their constituents. At the bureaucratic level, these incentives are linked to the mechanisms of oversight implemented by both their professional peers and the auditing entities. The international experience in chapter 3 demonstrates the central role of internal and external control in this matter. For this reason, from an anti-corruption perspective, it is essential to develop a coherent system for the prevention, detection, and control of irregularities at three levels:

- **First level:** self-control and hierarchical control. The first line of action in the fight against corruption is represented by public officials and by each person who performs a public function. In this regard, organizations must strengthen the mechanisms through which they may enhance and refine the values of their civil servants. The ethical performance of institutions cannot be entrusted to the free will of individuals. In this sense, senior management must be strengthened as the main party responsible for the application and fulfillment of the control mechanisms within each organization.
- **Second level:** internal control. The structure responsible for the internal audit function knows the daily and detailed activity of the organizational processes, which places them in a unique and advantageous position to prevent and correct possible irregularities on time. The operational strengthening of these units, the establishment of training processes that certify the professional quality of the central and municipal auditors, their strategic position in the organizational chart of the entity, the coordinated work with external control bodies and their orientation towards an advisory role for senior management, would have a positive impact on both the organizational functioning and the institution's anti-corruption as a whole.
- **Third level:** external control. Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) provide an independent and technical perspective of institutional performance. They are key actors in

strengthening citizen trust, since they provide information on the use of public resources, both at the political level and to the citizens as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to move forward in providing the necessary institutional safeguard mechanisms to give them sufficient political and budgetary autonomy to decrease the risk of political pressure in the exercise of their work. Likewise, the SAIs must have sufficient legal and operational powers to enable them to adapt to the new forms that corruption takes, and to have mechanisms of accountability and responsibility that prevent corruption phenomena within them.

Coordinated and coherent work among these three levels or lines of control is essential to achieve real results in the fight against this scourge. Consequently, it is necessary to move from an operational perspective, which only seeks to ensure that processes are developed as expected, to a strategic one, where control is a tool for strengthening good governance and, ultimately, a way to increase trust in public institutions.

In this second section, we have attempted to present and analyze how the political and administrative dyad requires the design of differentiated anti-corruption measures. At the political level, it is necessary to develop clear and permanent actions of commitment to integrity. Whereas at the administrative level, the improvement of institutional capacities through the strengthening of procurement, personnel and administrative control processes are needed. Advancing better anti-corruption strategies at these two levels is essential to address the duality that the fight against corruption presents.

Control should be understood as a strategic tool for strengthening good governance.

3. Uncertainty: old institutions and new realities

The current context, in which the state administration bodies must try to solve social problems and demands, is different from the one in which they were created. Today the techniques, processes and mechanisms for dealing with public affairs are different; there has been progress from operational management in interlinked chains of command communicated by messages on paper to digitally interconnected processes at the global level. These changes have been possible due to transformations in information technologies, which have made it easier for organizations to evolve and adapt to new advances and ways of working available in the market.

This has been accelerated and deepened by the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, many entities, public and private, had to start surprisingly rapid processes of modernization and incorporation of technologies to ensure the continuity of their work, without affecting the health of the organization's members, its suppliers and users. Likewise, the situation has shown how public problems transcend the borders of a nation and the uncertainty in which governments, businesses and society as a whole will have to live through for the next few years.

In this sense, the complexity and dynamism of public affairs demand that institutions develop better and more effective mechanisms of public governance, which will allow them to face the new problems brought about by modernity.

All of the above has translated into two relevant situations for the way public policies are developed. In the first place, traditional logic, where each public body operates in isolation, within the confines of its functions and powers, is no longer sufficient. On the contrary, it is necessary to develop governance strategies where the public sector assumes that it does not have a monopoly on the solutions to social problems, and promotes collective actions that involve and commit the private sector, civil society and multilateral international agencies as a whole. On the other hand, the lack of certainty about the challenges that the institutions will have to face in the future requires long-term work plans that, in general, establish action frameworks that would allow them

to face uncertainty with a clear north, without contingencies paralyzing the organizational exercise.

Based on these premises in the specific field of public integrity, today the complexity of effectively addressing corruption in dynamic scenarios of great uncertainty is defined by three elements: the difficulty of clearly establishing its limits and conceptual boundaries; the impossibility of adequately predicting the different forms it takes; and the multiplicity of factors that influence its occurrence.

In this context, this section presents two paths through which progress should be made in the fight against corruption in highly dynamic social contexts and with a long-term view. The first is to establish cross-cutting dialogues in society to involve the private sector, citizens and academia. The second relates to the development of medium and long-term strategies that define an objective to be achieved.

a) Involving citizens and the private sector in the fight against corruption

One of the most interesting results of the online citizen consultation, presented in chapter 2, relates to the perceptions that people have of the victims of corruption. Thus, when asked *who they think is most harmed by corruption?* 95% of respondents said that it was citizens in general. This figure shows that the public is aware this scourge affects society as a whole, clearly demonstrating that corruption is a social problem that could cause others of the same kind.

In line with these results, and as detailed in chapter 3, there is an international consensus about the importance for citizens not only to be aware of the impact that corruption has on society as a whole, but also to actively engage in fighting it.

To this end, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (ONU, 2004) encourages states to develop differentiated strategies that, on the one hand, increase citizen participation in fighting corruption and, on the other, involve the private sector in carrying out concrete actions to prevent bad practices. In this same sense, the OECD (OCDE, 2020) proposes to formulate public

To incorporate new perspectives in the fight against corruption, differentiated strategies must be developed for the private and the public sectors.

probity policies that include the population and businesses, since they play a relevant role in promoting a culture of integrity among their peers. Incorporating diverse actors in the implementation of public policies would allow for comprehensive collaborative actions to fight this scourge and increase the commitment to honesty in individuals and companies.

The main challenges for Chile in this field are concentrated in three areas: first, to develop citizen training programs at the national level that consider among their contents the relevance of democracy, public integrity standards and the risks of corruption –as presented in chapter 3– through the experiences of Austria, Hungary and South Korea. The importance of promoting this type of initiative is related to the need to educate future citizens from an early age on how to protect public integrity and fight against corruption, which will have a greater impact if it is done from the first years of schooling (OCDE, 2020a). In this sense, it is important to move towards the development of coordinated work between the public sector, civil society and educational institutions. This would be an appropriate starting point for designing pedagogical strategies to install and perfect the knowledge needed to actively involve citizens in the fight against corruption.

Analyzing the difficulties that people face in reporting irregularities, a second issue appears as well, which needs to be resolved to increase the commitment of citizens in the fighting against corruption. Thus, the results of the online citizen consultation mentioned in chapter 2 indicate that 51.4% of the participants were victims of and/or witnesses to an act of corruption, but 67.1% did not report it. Among the reasons given for this were the lack of confidence in the institutions that would hear the complaint (47.4%), the feeling of impunity (39.9%), the possibility of having received threats or reprisals (35.1%), and the lack of evidence or witnesses (34.3%). The above, as well as what was pointed out in chapter 1 by civil society organizations, shows the need to develop a comprehensive system that promotes the reporting of irregularities and protects those who do so. This system should at least consider:

- The establishment of internal and external channels through which people can alert to irregularities in the public sector.

- The prohibition of receiving punishment or reprisals in their workplace, as a result of an anti-corruption complaint, sanctioning those who do so.
- Definition of requirements for justified complaints and eventual sanctions for those who report in bad faith.
- Protection mechanisms available to whistleblowers.

These four elements are indispensable for making progress in this area and could be the starting position for improving those indicators that point to Chile as one of the countries in which those who decide to report irregularities are socially condemned (Transparencia Internacional, 2017).

Thirdly, the involvement of society as a whole does not only include individuals or civil society organizations; multiple international conventions encourage governments to promote the explicit commitment of companies in the fight against corruption (OCDE, 2009, 2011, 2019; OEA, 1996; ONU, 2011; OIT, 2017). In practice, this should translate into clear guidelines regarding prohibitions on behavior, but also regarding the good practices that can be expected from public and private companies. In Chile, initiatives such as the public enterprise system through the SEP code (SEP, 2017), the Fundación Generación Empresarial or the Chilean-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry-CAMCHAL through the Alliance for Integrity initiative or Chile Compra (2018) through its *Code of Ethics for Suppliers*, have led processes to raise ethical standards in companies; however, there is still much to be done.

In Chile to strengthen the contribution and role that companies of all sizes have in the fight against corruption is still recognized as a challenge (Fundación Generación Empresarial, 2019). Companies are required to develop concrete commitments, aimed at establishing internal anti-corruption policies, which promote compliance with integrity standards, in addition to developing compliance programs to foster an organizational culture of integrity in their management processes (OCDE, 2020a). This is especially relevant in government service providers, which, as mentioned above, are especially exposed to integrity risks in their transactions with public organizations and, therefore, require greater controls and the best practices to prevent integrity breaches (OCDE, n.d.-d).

The complexity of the phenomenon of corruption requires seeking solutions beyond the public sector.

In summary, it is important to emphasize that in a context of uncertainty and constant social change, the solution to the phenomenon of corruption will not come exclusively from the public sector. Therefore, it is necessary to move towards a networked public administration that commits organized civil society and public and private companies to strengthening integrity.

b) Developing long-term strategies

Like the results indicated in the previous point, the online citizen consultation provides results on what will be the future situation of Chile in the fight against corruption. In response to the question, *"Thinking ahead 5 more years, will Chile be more or less corrupt?"* 46.3% of those surveyed believe that the country will be more or much more corrupt, which shows that people have a negative perception about the evolution of this phenomenon in the future.

These results reiterate the ideas about the urgency of anticipating the development of these issues and thinking about the fight against this scourge today, but also with a long-term vision.

In this regard, the United Nations Convention against Corruption encourages states to develop "coordinated and effective anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability" (ONU, 2004, article 5). In practice, this has translated into the task undertaken by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support countries in developing coordinated efforts to implement comprehensive and long-term anti-corruption plans, both at the national and institutional levels (UNODC, 2017). In this context, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was adopted, which promotes the development of anti-corruption strategies through participatory platforms that consider the opinions of public officials, but also actors from civil society (ONU, 2013). Based on this, the UNODC (2017) published a practical guide for the development of national anti-corruption strategies, which establishes that countries should:

- **Carry out a preliminary diagnosis of corruption and an analysis of the situation in the country.** To do so, they must hold broad consultations with the active participation of

citizens, which will make it possible to jointly identify how this scourge is presented in the country.

- **Formulate measures to combat corruption.** At this stage, they must establish the specific mechanisms that will be adopted within the framework of the strategy to combat corruption, along with a description of the objective that each of them will have, as well as the associated cost and time frame for their implementation. These measures must be adaptable, effective, and measurable: Adaptable, because corruption is a phenomenon that changes in time and space.

Furthermore, they must be effective, because they must discourage corrupt behavior and facilitate its detection; and measurable, to show the levels of progress and regression in this fight.

- **Define a follow-up and evaluation plan for the strategy.** For each of the measures that will make up the strategy, a follow-up and evaluation mechanism must be established to oversee its implementation. In this sense, it is necessary to define the process, product and result indicators that will be informed in the delivery of reports and briefings.

These good practices have already been developed by several countries through national plans or anti-corruption strategies, which seek to organize efforts of government scope or applied in specific segments of the public sector. Below are some outstanding practices and their year of preparation:

- **Germany (2012):** its strategy presents anti-corruption mechanisms of national scope through three levels of intervention and three actors that give rise to nine implementation principles (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012).
- **United Kingdom (2017):** its national anti-corruption strategy focuses on strengthening integrity in international trade, proposing short and long-term goals with indicators to gauge the effectiveness of measures. In 2019, they updated the document in light of the new national context (HM Government, n.d.).
- **Colombia (2013):** this document is based on the premise of the inefficiency of the current system, for which two cross-cutting strategies are proposed: the territorial dimension

**International
experience
shows the need
to advance
anti-corruption
strategies
with long-term
objectives.**

of the corruption problem and the implementation of a comprehensive follow-up, monitoring and evaluation of the policy (Secretaría de Transparencia, 2013).

- **Mexico (2019):** its national anti-corruption policy is structured on the basis of a dual viewpoint: the need to propose nationwide actions to reduce corruption and the need to attack this phenomenon from a systemic perspective (Secretaría Ejecutiva SNA, n.d.).

In recent years, Chile has made progress in developing multiple initiatives to strengthen the fight against corruption. Among other measures, and according to the different stages of the phenomenon, the following can be highlighted:

- **Prevention:** the participatory development of codes of ethics in central government institutions and the strengthening of the national system for the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism by the Financial Analysis Unit.
- **Detection:** the enactment of Law No 20,880 on probity in public service and prevention of conflicts of interest stipulated that senior officials of the Chilean public administration must present declarations of interests and assets, gave greater powers to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and established a digital platform to identify irregularities through the analysis of massive data.
- **Investigation:** Metropolitan Anti-Corruption Investigation Brigade of the Investigations Police of Chile was created.
- **Sanction:** Law No. 21,121 was enacted, which increases the penalties for the crimes of bribery and kickbacks.

However, efforts are still pending to coordinate an intersectoral anti-corruption policy that involves the public institutions that make up the integrity system as well as civil society. In this sense, it is necessary to improve how organizations identify and adopt international good practices, and to advance in the development of national anti-corruption strategies that allow for the approach of this phenomenon through an integrated view of the different causes, manifestations and effects.

As it has been reiterated in this study, these initiatives are the starting point for increasing the impact that anti-corruption measures have on

institutions and make it possible to strengthen how public servants, the private sector, academia and citizens, in general, are committed to the consolidation of a culture of public integrity.

Historical evidence shows that Chile is a country with strong roots of probity and public integrity (Silva, 2018). However, such a character cannot be a reason for tranquility and indifference, on the contrary, it requires taking the necessary safeguards to face future challenges without damaging this important institutional heritage.

The new social dynamics, technological advancements, and the transformations in public problems require that state institutions be agile, flexible, capable of connecting with their environment and anticipating the challenges that society presents. Therefore, the reforms and modernization actions of the state must be continuous processes that improve how organizations impact the lives of citizens.

The logic of working in silos that has prevailed in public institutions is destined for failure, since it will not allow for the resolution of the complex challenges that democracy faces. The development of effective short-term programs must be abandoned and replaced by public policies built-in networks, with the participation of the public sector, academia, civil society organizations and the private sector. Only in this way will it be possible to respond to citizens' demands with a state perspective that transcends the various governments.

This study has presented an introductory view of the conceptualization of corruption, the causes that give rise to it, the factors that aggravate its consequences, and how Chilean institutions attempt to combat it. It also explored the public's perception of this phenomenon, identifying a critical view that people have of the present and future situation of corruption, the areas most exposed to risks of probity, and the role that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic should play in curbing this scourge. At the same time, a series of good international practices were identified in the areas of control, technology, ethical training, citizen participation, and protection of those who report cases of corruption, as concrete tools for strengthening public integrity.

In conclusion, this chapter presented three challenges for addressing corruption from a long-term perspective: first, the complexity of dealing with a phenomenon that is mutating and taking on increasingly sophisticated forms; second, the duality that exists in the exercise of civil service between politics and the administration, which poses the challenge of developing differentiated strategies for each level; and third, the uncertainty faced by organizations in the face of a society that is constantly evolving and giving rise to new problems. For each of these challenges, the study has identified a set of ideas and measures that point to a path that should be taken to strengthen probity at the state level. These paths should not be considered a universal response to the current difficulties of democracy; on the contrary, they hope to be the starting point for the discussions the country faces, to consolidate the values of integrity and strengthen the principles of good administration.


The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has a clear constitutional mandate, but at the same time it is limited in the fight against corruption. On the one hand, the preventive legal control and the subsequent auditing that it carries out through its audits are powerful and effective tools to prevent, detect and investigate irregularities in public entities. However, corruption is a much broader phenomenon whose scope transcends the sphere of administrative control. For this reason, it is essential to increase and promote coordination among the various institutions responsible for strengthening probity in the state. Only through collaborative and inter-institutional work will it be possible to respond to citizens' expectations to consolidate a culture of zero tolerance for corruption.

In the view of the Comptroller General's Office, the fight against corruption does not end with the care and proper use of public resources. The key to strengthening probity is a political commitment at the highest level to eradicate public and private bad practices, the promotion of effective

regulatory changes to enhance institutional capacities, and the design and implementation of public policies of integrity based on specialist knowledge, which has an impact on the functioning of the administration and citizen perception.

Today, it is indisputable that corruption undermines democracy from within and hinders sustainable economic growth. However, its effects have much more profound consequences for vulnerable groups, whose living conditions depend largely on state aid. For this reason, corruption is much more than a problem of poor administrative processes or ineffective public policies. The fight against corruption is a moral imperative for all those in civil service; only in this way can respect for human rights be ensured, a better democracy consolidated, and better living conditions offered to all people.

Image 4.3: Ways to strengthen honesty



Source: Author prepared.

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Annex 1:

Methodology of the citizen consultation: What do you think about corruption in Chile?

1. Methodology

This chapter discloses the methods and data used in the online consultation on corruption in Chile, led by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in collaboration with Chile Transparente and the Universidad Austral de Chile. The chapter is structured as follows: first, it presents the objectives and relevance of the survey. Second, it provides arguments regarding the type of study and the research questions that guide the analysis and interpretation of the data. Third, it describes the process of preparing the consultation, which shows the steps in the construction and implementation of the consult, along with the fundamental characteristics of the data obtained. Fourth, it defines the operationalization of the variables, thus contemplating the goals to be covered by the consultation, the measured dimension of the indicated purposes, the factors derived from the dimensions, the indicators to be measured, and the questions that result from this. Fifth, it explains briefly the methods used to end with the limitations of this monograph from a methodological point of view.

2. Relevance and objectives

As we saw in chapter 1, corruption is a phenomenon that is widespread in both the public and private domains, where no organization is immune to it. It is based on the abuse of power of a position that a person holds in an organizational structure in pursuit of personal gain (Transparencia Internacional, 2020). However, according to the review of literature and official documents in chapter 1, the subject remains a confusing concept, elastic as it can encompass many actions and sectors, as well as more specific aspects of an institution's work. Also, except for studies and publications by the Council for Transparency (Consejo para la Transparencia, 2019), especially the "proposal for a national agreement on public integrity and anti-corruption," there is not much work developed by public entities that deals with violations of probity. In this sense, the mere fact that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, given its constitutional mission, is leading a consultation on corruption is, in itself, a substantive input to the discussion about this issue and its ramifications.

Similarly, the decision to opt for a self-reporting measurement instrument, taking into account the criticisms and recommendations that have emerged from the social sciences, is based on four basic aspects:

- **Budget:** the budgetary constraints are real and the costs of carrying out a national survey, with regional face-to-face representation, financially exceed the wishes and institutional capacities of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.
- **Nature of the consultation:** although it will be explained later, the nature of this online consultation is exploratory, since it does not seek to infer or explain relationships between variables or phenomena. On the contrary, while the topic of corruption is not new as an object of analysis in general—academia and think tanks—, it is new to public organizations in the internal sense of reflecting on the threats to public service from this perspective. Thus, and as Babbie (2007) explains, social science research is carried out to explore a topic and begin to become familiar with it. In this case,

the Comptroller's Office, as a public agency committed to reducing corruption, is conducting an initial study on this topic.

- **Scope:** considering that the application of a face-to-face survey was rejected, the fact that we can count on an online measurement instrument opened up opportunities to surpass the average sample of public opinion surveys at the national level, which is around 1,500 to 2,000 cases. In this sense, a digital consultation made it possible to overcome this threshold of responses, while generating more information and findings in the format of research questions and open hypotheses for the future.

3. Development of the citizen consultation

The development of the online consultation was a process of teamwork led by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, together with the support of Chile Transparente and the Universidad Austral de Chile. This process began in September and included two phases:

Preparation: this phase began with the review of literature and official documents –laws, public accounts, reports– to limit the object of study and provide the fundamental guidelines for the construction of the virtual consultation questions. Once this task had been carried out, a draft was prepared with the intended questions for the poll. This activity resulted in significant time-consuming work for the three organizations, since the questions had to be polished to make them easier to understand, thereby covering the meaningful dimensions of the phenomenon under study. Once agreed, the questionnaire was sent to the Computer Center of the Comptroller General of the Republic for digitization, to make the online survey possible. When this operation was completed, it was presented to the extended team to make the appropriate adjustments and comments before moving on to the next phase: implementation.

Implementation: previously to enable the online consultation, there were activities that preceded the execution. The first was the response to the measurement instrument by the members of the three entities, whose main objective is to reduce biases: for understanding and information asymmetries, for questionnaire structure and response context, and for socially desirable response (Nederhof, 1985; Randall & Fernandes, 1991; Brener *et al.*, 2003). Once the members of the working group answered the questions, a meeting was held to discuss perceptions and suggestions for adjusting the questionnaire. The result was sent to the Information Technology Unit to update the digital survey, following the new agreed upon parameters. After this, the measurement instrument was pretested for the second time, now on public officials, members of the civil society and academics. This, in order to reduce the biases reported by the social sciences

in relation to self-reported instruments. They were given a period of 4 to 5 calendar days, at the end of which the observations and suggestions were collected for inclusion by the Information Technology Unit. Only then was the computer consultation opened between August 17 and 24, 2020 on the Comptroller's Office website. It should be added that the work team considered extending the period, but gave it up when they realized that the number of responses already satisfied the initial objective, which was to have at least five thousand valid responses, and this was duly accomplished.

4. Operationalization of the variables

Having reviewed the literature and official documents, and identified the objectives, type of study and research question, it is now time to present the operationalization of the variables. For Babbie (2007), “operationalization is the process of elaborating operational definitions, or of specifying the exact operations involved in measuring a variable” (p. 44). Consequently, the questionnaire proposal of this consultation was aimed at identifying variables, indicators and questions that would make the concepts and discussion presented in chapter 1 applicable in a simple and real way.

Table 1: Operationalization of the variables of the online consultation

Specific goals	Variables	Indicators	Questions
Manifestations of corruption	Severity level of actions	Severity level of actions	How corrupt do you think the following actions are? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - That a public official accepts money to speed up a process. - For a person to lie to obtain a benefit from the government. - That a public official uses his work hours for personal business. - That an authority or a public official favors a family member or friend. - That a benefit be granted to someone for being a relative of an authority. - That a public official is ineffective in his job. - That an authority or public official does not report an act of corruption.
	Probability level of actions	Probability level of actions	How likely are you to do the following? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hide and/or modify some of my personal data to get a profit. - Using materials from my work place for personal purposes. - To help a family member or friend using my position at my work place. - Failure to report an act of corruption. - To pay and/or offer money to speed up a process.

Specific goals	Variables	Indicators	Questions
Corruption in Chile	Victim of corruption	Victim and/or witness of corruption	Have you been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption?
		Group harmed by corruption	Who do you think is (are) most affected by corruption?
	Report act of corruption	Report of corruption	Did you report the act of corruption of which you were a victim and/or witness?
		Reasons not to report	Why didn't you report the act of corruption of which you were a victim and/or witness?
	Level of corruption in Chile	Perceived corruption previous year	Compared to the previous year, is Chile more or less corrupt?
		Perception of current corruption	How corrupt do you consider our country to be?
		Perceived corruption in 5 more years	How do you think corruption will be in Chile in the next 5 years?
		Most corrupt areas	What are the areas where there is more corruption in Chile?
Anti-corruption actions	Main problems to address	Level of agreement with the Comptroller's work	<p>Of the work of the Comptroller's Office, how much do you agree with the following statements?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Comptroller's Office is the institution responsible for fighting corruption. - The Comptroller's Office is impartial in its work. - The Comptroller's Office has an adequate response time. - The Comptroller's Office carries out quality audits. - The Comptroller's Office always works within its legal functions.
		Actions to strengthen the Comptroller's Office	What should the Comptroller's Office do to strengthen its role in the fight against corruption

Source: author prepared.

In relation to the respondent's profile questions, these are the following: age, gender, region, commune, occupation, educational level, knowledge of corruption, do you use social media? Have you seen social media posts of the Comptroller's Office? By what means have you found out what the Comptroller's Office does?

In order to reduce the categories of questions and thus achieving greater parsimony, the following categories were changed:

- **Age >>> age range:** this variable was recoded from a scale type to an ordinal one. Thus, six categories were constructed: under 18 years, 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 or more years. The Casen 2017 survey was used to distinguish the categories (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, 2020a), specifically the education section and the schooling subsection. However, in order to obtain greater variability and more in-depth analysis, Casen's original categories were adjusted.
- **Gender >>> gender (2):** this variable was dichotomized from a question with four options (feminine, masculine, no response, others), remaining in two categories: feminine and masculine. The other categories were recorded as missing values, because of the small number of responses.
- **Occupation >>> occupation (2):** this variable was recoded from a nominal type –nine categories– to a nominal type–eight categories–. Thus, the following categories: no information / unemployed, professor, homemaker, entrepreneur, student, public official, state providers, self-employed / private sector. The categories of the Casen 2017 survey were considered for the design of the question (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, 2020b), specifically the working section and population distribution subsection employed by occupational category (2006-2017). However, and with the purpose of obtaining a more in-depth analysis, the original categories of the Casen were adjusted, leaving the self-employed worker and the private sector worker in a single category.

- **Education level >>> education level (2):** this variable was recoded from an ordinal type –eleven categories– to an ordinal type –six categories– with fewer categories. Thus, the following categories were constructed: not reported, primary studies, secondary studies, technical studies, university studies, post-graduate studies. The categories from the Casen 2017 survey were considered for the design of the question (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, 2020b), specifically the work section and the subsection on labor participation rate by educational level (2006-2017).

5. Analysis method

Once the period of the online consultation was over, the data was entered into a “.csv”. This file was transferred to an Excel spreadsheet in order to clean the database, thus leaving the variables that were going to be used in the analysis of the data. As noted above, new variables were created to reduce the number of categories in the respondent profile questions: age, gender, occupation, and educational level.

6. Limitations

The online citizen consultation on corruption in Chile is based on a self-reporting process¹ to learn about people’s perceptions and attitudes towards this phenomenon.

Along these lines, questions or topics in the self-reporting online consultation may be under or over-represented, as they may be influenced by socially desirable or undesirable responses or behaviors, *i.e.*, biases in the responses, especially on issues related to corruption and its manifestations. Likewise, Brener *et al.* (2003) state that “most of the data provided by self-reporting cannot be independently verified in a cost-effective viable, and ethical way” (p. 437). As we can see, biases can function as devices for generating positive or negative responses, depending on what is being asked and the context in which it is asked. Similarly, social

¹ The concepts of self-reporting, self-evaluation and self-administration are used as synonyms in this study.

desirability is considered a distortion of responses in a socially desirable direction, which, for Nederhof (1985), is the result of two factors: self-deception and vague belief.

Regarding the factors affecting the validity of this type of measurement instrument, Nederhof (1985) identifies the existence of determinants of social desirability bias: situational determinants and personal determinants. Following Brener *et al.* (2003), two are the theoretical perspectives that have explained the sources of validity of the problems that could emerge with self-reported data. The first one is the cognitive perspective. This approach “focuses on the mental processes underlying self-reported data and attributes validity problems to inaccuracies arising from comprehension, recall, and other cognitive operations” (Brener *et al.*, 2003, p. 437). The second perspective is the situational one, which focuses on the validity problems that emerge from the related factors of social desirability and the conditions of the interviews. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive.

The cognitive perspective postulates four basic cognitive processes that influence the question and answer process: a) understanding, b) recall, c) decision making, and d) response generation. In turn, the situational perspective focuses on validity problems arising from characteristics of the external environment rather than from internal treatment. Factors that are presumed to be particularly influential include the presence of others while answering questions and respondents’ perceptions of the level of privacy or confidentiality afforded to the responses. Social desirability, which is the desire to give others a favorable impression of oneself, is a construct used to explain situational biases.

As a way to mitigate the potential biases of social desirability that could appear, a table is presented with the perspective that analyzes the biases of social desirability, bias, problem and mitigation mode. It should be said that some biases remain as challenges and lessons for a future application of this measurement instrument.

Table 2: Identification of potential social desirability biases according to perspective, problem and mitigation mode

Perspective	Bias	Problem	Mitigation Mode
Cognitive	Understanding bias and information asymmetries	Understanding overly technical unfamiliar terms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use simple and familiar terms for self-reporters. - Application of two pre-tests.
	Recall or memory bias	Difficulty defining and using periods of reference.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use simple terms and go back only one year (memory of corruption actions).
	Bias by use of social media	Focusing of responses by people with high exposure to social media and potential fake news.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Application of two pre-tests. - Control results using social media. - This aspect is expected to improve in the future.
Situational	Bias by questionnaire structure and response context	Tiredness due to the length of the questionnaire. Halo Effect.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Five minutes as the time to respond. - Do not saturate pages with questions, dividing them into different screens. - Application of two pre-tests.
	Social pressure bias	Fear of reprisals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure privacy and confidentiality in responses. - Online administration of the questionnaire.
	Mistrust bias	Negative perception of privacy and confidentiality.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure privacy and confidentiality in responses. - Online administration of the questionnaire.
	Socially desirable response bias	Low or over representation of a view in the answers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online administration of the questionnaire. - Application of two pre-tests.
	Bias due to desire to participate more than once	The same user could answer the online consultation more than once.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Once a person responds from an IP, that IP is blocked. - This aspect is expected to improve in the future.

Source: Fuentes-González (2019).

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Annex 2:

Report of citizen consultation data What do you think of corruption?

This annex presents the frequency tables with the answers to each of the 30 questions that were asked in the online consultation detailed in chapter 2 of this publication. The database with the answers obtained from this online consultation is available for download on the Office of the Comptroller’s website.

1. Profile of people surveyed

1.1. Age range

	Number	%
Less than 18 years of age.	98	0.6
18-29	3,843	22.9
30-39	5,672	33.7
40-49	3,798	22.6
50-59	2,049	12.2
60 or more years	1,349	8
Total	16,809	100

1.2. Gender

	Number	%
Male	9,187	54.7
Female	7,393	44.0
No response/other	228	1.4
Total	16,809	100

1.3. Location

	Number	%
Tarapacá	207	1.2
Antofagasta	437	2.6
Atacama	250	1.5
Coquimbo	496	3.0
Valparaíso	1,784	10.6
O'Higgins	500	3.0
Maule	538	3.2
Biobío	1,105	6.6
La Araucanía	592	3.5
Los Lagos	642	3.8
Aysén	160	1.0
Magallanes	192	1.1
Metropolitana	9,007	53.6
Los Ríos	470	2.8
Arica - Parinacota	188	1.1
Ñuble	241	1.4
Total	16,809	100

1.4. Occupation

	Number	%
Not informed/unemployed	1,455	8.7
Professor	751	4.5
Homemaker	418	2.5
Entrepreneur	801	4.8
Student	1,878	11.2
Public official	5,226	31.1
State providers	198	1.2
Self-employed/private sector	6,082	36.2
Total	16,809	100

1.5. Educational level

	Number	%
No information	74	0.4
Primary studies	25	0.1
Secondary studies	925	5.5
Technical studies	2,514	15.0
University studies	9,685	57.6
Post-graduate degree	3,584	21.3
Total	16,807	100
Missing values	2	0.0

1.6. Knowledge of corruption

	Number	%
None	97	0.6
2	758	4.5
3	4,687	27.9
4	6,651	39.6
Quite a bit	4,616	27.7
Total	16,809	100

1.7. Use of social media

	Number	%
No	469	2.8
Yes	16,340	97.2
Total	16,809	100

1.8. Social media posts of the Comptroller's Office

	Number	%
No	2,366	14.1
Yes	14,443	85.9
Total	16,809	100

1.9. Means of access to information of the Comptroller's Office

		Number	%
Family or friends?	No	14,081	83.8
	Yes	2,728	16.2
Social media	No	3,494	20.8
	Yes	13,315	79.2
Work or studies	No	10,098	60.1
	Yes	6,711	39.9
TV	No	12,906	76.8
	Yes	3,903	23.2
Newspaper	No	13,052	77.6
	Yes	3,757	22.4
Radio	No	14,467	86.1
	Yes	2,342	13.9
Digital press	No	9,084	54.0
	Yes	7,725	46.0

2. Manifestation of corruption: level of severity and probability of actions

2.1. Severity level of actions. How corrupt do you think the following actions are?

2.1.1. That a public official accepts money to speed up a process

	Number	%
Not corrupt	201	1.2
2	349	2.1
3	779	4.6
4	1,477	8.8
Totally corrupt	14,003	83.3
Total	16,809	100

2.1.2. That a person lies to obtain some benefit from the Government

	Number	%
Not corrupt	281	1.7
2	755	4.5
3	2,479	14.7
4	3,566	21.2
Totally corrupt	9,728	57.9
Total	16,809	100

2.1.3. That a public official does personal business on work hours

	Number	%
Not corrupt	717	4.3
2	1,674	10.0
3	4,030	24.0
4	4,398	26.2
Totally corrupt	5,990	35.6
Total	16,809	100

2.1.4. That an authority or a public official favors a family member or friend

	Number	%
Not corrupt	100	0.6
2	182	1.1
3	714	4.2
4	2,405	14.3
Totally corrupt	13,408	79.8
Total	16,809	100

2.1.5. That a benefit is granted to someone for being a relative of an authority

	Number	%
Not corrupt	113	.7
2	111	.7
3	294	1.7
4	1,013	6.0
Totally corrupt	15,278	90.9
Total	16,809	100

2.1.6. That a public official is ineffective in his job

	Number	%
Not corrupt	2,279	13.6
2	2,063	12.3
3	4,104	24.4
4	3,332	19.8
Totally corrupt	5,031	29.9
Total	16,809	100

2.1.7. That an authority or public official does not report an act of corruption

	Number	%
Not corrupt	282	1.7
2	422	2.5
3	1,831	10.9
4	2,941	17.5
Totally corrupt	11,333	67.4
Total	16,809	100

2.2. How likely are you to do the following? Mark 1 if “not at all probable” and 5 “totally probable”

2.2.1. How likely are you to do the following: pay or offer money to speed up a process

	Number	%
Not likely at all	15,290	91
2	796	4.7
3	309	1.8
4	146	0.9
Completely Likely	268	1.6
Total	16,809	100

2.2.2. How likely are you to do the following: hide or modify some of my personal data for a profit

	Number	%
Not likely at all	12,477	74.2
2	2,560	15.2
3	1,027	6.1
4	420	2.5
Completely Likely	325	1.9
Total	16,809	100

2.2.3. How likely are you to do the following: use material from where I work for personal purposes (for example: printer or office supplies)

	Number	%
Not likely at all	6,320	37.6
2	5,607	33.4
3	2,517	15.0
4	1,392	8.3
Completely Likely	973	5.8
Total	16,809	100

2.2.4. How likely are you to do the following: help a family member or friend using my position at my place of work

	Number	%
Not likely at all	9,274	55.2
2	4,388	26.1
3	1,981	11.8
4	743	4.4
Completely Likely	423	2.5
Total	16,809	100

2.2.5. How likely are you to take the following actions: not reporting an act of corruption

	Number	%
Not likely at all	7,103	42.3
2	2,923	17.4
3	3,577	21.3
4	1,683	10.0
Completely Likely	1,523	9.1
Total	16,809	100

3. Corruption in Chile

3.2. Have you been a victim and/or witness of an act of corruption?

	Number	%
No	8,164	48.6
Yes	8,645	51.4
Total	16,809	100

3.3. Report an act of corruption

	Number	%
No	5,798	67.1
Yes	2,847	32.9
Total	8.645	100

3.4. Who do you think is most harmed by corruption?

3.4.2. Citizens in general

	Number	%
No	879	5.2
Yes	15,930	94.8
Total	16,809	100

3.4.3. Private companies

	Number	%
No	16,132	96.0
Yes	677	4.0
Total	16,809	100

3.4.4. Government service providers

	Number	%
No	15,810	94.1
Yes	999	5.9
Total	16,809	100

3.4.5. State-owned enterprises

	Number	%
No	15,372	91.5
Yes	1,437	8.5
Total	16,809	100

3.4.6. Public officials

	Number	%
No	14,631	87.0
Yes	2,178	13.0
Total	16,809	100

3.4.7. Government

	Number	%
No	15,113	81.9
Yes	1,696	10.1
Total	16,809	100

3.4.8. Civil society organizations

	Number	%
No	14,356	85.4
Yes	2,453	14.6
Total	16,809	100

3.4.9. Political parties

	Number	%
No	16,552	98.5
Yes	257	1.5
Total	16,809	100

3.4.10. People in vulnerable situations

	Number	%
No	8,137	48.4
Yes	8,672	51.6
Total	16,809	100

3.4.11. People receiving state benefits

	Number	%
No	12,145	72.3
Yes	4,664	27.7
Total	16,809	100

3.4.12. Public sector

	Number	%
No	12,983	77.2
Yes	3,826	22.8
Total	16,809	100

3.5. Reasons to not report

3.5.1. Because you may have received threats or reprisals

	Number	%
No	3,763	64.9
Yes	2,035	35.1
Total	5,798	100

3.5.2. Because I had no evidence or witnesses

	Number	%
No	3,809	65.7
Yes	1,989	34.3
Total	5,798	100

3.5.3. Because I knew those responsible

	Number	%
No	5,205	89.8
Yes	593	10.2
Total	5,798	100

3.5.4. Because I distrusted the institutions that will see my complaint

	Number	%
No	3,048	52.6
Yes	2,750	47.4
Total	5,798	100

3.5.5. Because I did not know where to make the complaint

	Number	%
No	4,922	84.9
Yes	876	15.1
Total	5,798	100

3.5.6. Because someone recommended me not to report

	Number	%
No	5,497	94.8
Yes	301	5.2
Total	5,798	100

3.5.7. Because the case was not serious enough

	Number	%
No	5,054	87.2
Yes	744	12.8
Total	5,798	100

3.5.8. Because the complaint would have no consequences

	Number	%
No	3,484	60.1
Yes	2,314	39.9
Total	5,798	100

3.6. Compared to the previous year, is Chile more or less corrupt?

	Number	%
Much less corrupt	104	.6
2	677	4.0
3	4,211	25.1
4	5,253	31.3
Much more corrupt	6,564	39.1
Total	16,809	100

3.7. How corrupt do you consider our country to be?

	Number	%
Not corrupt	25	.1
2	587	3.5
3	3,254	19.4
4	7,500	44.6
Totally corrupt	5,443	32.4
Total	16,809	100

3.8. Thinking ahead 5 years, will Chile be more or less corrupt?

	Number	%
Much less corrupt	654	3.9
2	3,334	19.8
3	5,035	30.0
4	4,038	24.0
Much more corrupt	3,748	22.3
Total	16,809	100

3.9. What are the areas where there is more corruption in Chile?

3.9.1. Public procurement

	Number	%
No	4,732	28.2
Yes	12,077	71.8
	16,809	100
Total	16,809	100

3.9.2. Staff recruitment

	Number	%
No	5,825	34.7
Yes	10,984	65.3
	16,809	100
Total	16,809	100

3.9.3. Delivery of social benefits

	Number	%
No	10,957	65.2
Yes	5,852	34.8
	16,809	100
Total	16,809	100

3.9.4. Construction of public works

	Number	%
No	7,727	46.0
Yes	9,082	54.0
	16,809	100
Total	16,809	100

3.9.5. Inspection and audits

	Number	%
No	11,329	67.4
Yes	5,480	32.6
	16,809	100
Total	16,809	100

4. National actions in the matter of anti-corruption

4.5. What should the Comptroller's Office do to strengthen its role in the fight against corruption?

4.5.1. More audit and control of public resources

	Number	%
No	3,678	21.9
Yes	13,131	78.1
Total	16,809	100

4.5.2. Faster in its work

	Number	%
No	13,007	77.4
Yes	3,802	22.6
Total	16,809	100

4.5.3. More training for public officials

	Number	%
No	11,921	70.9
Yes	4,888	29.1
Total	16,809	100

4.5.4. Increase collaboration with the public sector

	Number	%
No	12,976	77.2
Yes	3,833	22.8
Total	16,809	100

4.5.5. Use more technology

	Number	%
No	12,803	76.2
Yes	4,006	23.8
Total	16,809	100

4.5.6. More legal functions to fight corruption

	Number	%
No	5,639	33.5
Yes	11,170	66.5
Total	16,809	100

4.5.7. Improve response to citizen complaints

	Number	%
No	10,803	64.3
Yes	6,006	35.7
Total	16,809	100

4.6. From the role of the Comptroller's Office. How much do you agree with the following statements?

4.6.1. The Comptroller's Office is the institution responsible for fighting corruption

	Number	%
Strongly disagree	429	2.6
2	406	2.5
3	1,607	9.8
4	3,421	20.8
Strongly agree	10,574	64.3
Total	16,437	100

4.6.2. The Comptroller's Office is impartial in its work

	Number	%
Strongly disagree	872	5.5
2	840	5.3
3	2,368	14.9
4	3,664	23.0
Strongly agree	8,156	51.3
Total	15,900	100

4.6.3. The Comptroller’s Office has an adequate response time

	Number	%
Strongly disagree	1,432	10.6
2	1,737	12.8
3	3,970	29.3
4	3,609	26.6
Strongly agree	2,813	20.7
Total	13,561	100

4.6.4. The Comptroller’s Office performs quality audits

	Number	%
Strongly disagree	913	6.3
2	1,274	8.8
3	3,213	22.3
4	4,796	33.3
Strongly agree	4,211	29.2
Total	14,407	100

4.6.5. The Comptroller’s Office always works within its legal functions

	Number	%
Strongly disagree	417	2.8
2	512	3.5
3	1,535	10.4
4	3,258	22
Strongly agree	9,084	61.4
Total	14,806	100

